The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
a plan for
a political process, which might emerge from the Iraqi opposition
or
within the
country;
•
ensuring
full respect for human rights;
•
administering
OFF;
•
reintegration
of Iraq into the world economy; and
•
a realistic
exit strategy.
667.
Security would
remain the responsibility of the Coalition:
•
internal
security (“pacification of unrest”), which would fall to the
military and be
provided
initially by the Coalition;
•
external
security, where Iraqi forces “would probably have to be replaced”;
and
•
“law and
order issues”, which “might be handled by local police forces but
with
strong
international monitoring”.
668.
The FCO
advised that tackling Iraq’s administration and reconstruction
called for
a focus on
key ministries, including defence, interior, justice, finance and
oil, and the
regional
administration (18 governorates and Baghdad).
669.
Some
institutions (election machinery, parliament, a regional affairs
ministry and
Human
Rights Commission) would need complete replacement or setting up
from
scratch.
Some (the Revolutionary Command Council, intelligence and internal
security
services,
the Ba’ath Party and the presidential apparatus) would need to be
dismantled.
Institutions
in other areas (labour, planning, education, health and
agriculture) could be
left
largely in Iraqi hands. That analysis applied whether the
administration was headed
by the US
military or the UN.
670.
The FCO
suggested that the civilian administration be divided into
“pillars” on
the Kosovo
model, with the Coalition taking on, as a minimum, defence and
interior.
Other
pillars might include civil administration, reconstruction,
economic reintegration,
institution-building
and justice and home affairs.
671.
On the
appointment of a UN “figurehead”, the draft stated: “We would need
a
heavyweight
Special Representative, ideally a Muslim, who would be prepared to
spend
time in
Iraq leading the IA [interim administration], backed up by
high-calibre senior staff.”
672.
There was no
reference to any UK contribution.
673.
The FCO
advised that the number of Iraqis and non-Iraqis needed for
civil
administration
would be large, but that the UN system was “unlikely to be able to
produce
all the
people needed on time”. The UK “should look at a range of other
sources:
•
Other
international institutions, e.g. IMF and World Bank
•
Coalition
players
226