3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
383.
Mr Kevin
Tebbit, the MOD Permanent Under Secretary, visited Washington
from
5 to 7
December 2001 where his meetings with a range of contacts included
discussions
on
Afghanistan and the next stage of the war against
terrorism.179
384.
Reporting to
Mr Hoon on the visit, Mr Tebbit stated that Washington saw itself
as
being on a
“war footing” and “the focus on international terrorism remains
intense”.180
That focus
influenced “the US attitude and approach to the rest of the
agenda”. In his
view that
meant:
“UK views
are listened to, like nobody else’s; all doors are open (but it
doesn’t mean
that we can
easily get our way or secure our interests);
“… if we
want our advice to be heeded on general pol/mil
[political/military] issues,
we need to
place it in the context of counter-terrorism post 11 September
…
everything
needs to relate back to the war in some way if we are to catch
their ear;
and
“… there is
a widespread and bipartisan sense, extending well beyond
Administration
‘hawks’
that Iraq will need to be dealt with sooner rather than later. This
rationale
is not
quite as simplistic as we like to think. They do not suspect Saddam
of
complicity
in 11 September. But they regard it as all too likely that he will
make WMD
available
to terrorist groups without much warning. Our success in dissuading
the
Administration
from military action without proper political and diplomatic
preparation
(though
there was no sense that a military move was imminent) will depend
on our
ability to
engage constructively on the strategy and tactics.”
385.
The report was
also sent to the FCO, Sir Christopher Meyer, and to Sir
David
Manning.
386.
While Mr
Tebbit was in Washington, an attempt was made by a senior
Republican
close to
the Pentagon to persuade him that the Iraqi National Congress could
be a
force to be
reckoned with sufficient to cause an Iraqi response and enable the
US to
take
supportive military action. Mr Tebbit commissioned an analysis of
that thesis which
he expected
would “show it to be flawed”.181
387.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that the desire in the US State Department
was
to move
down the UN track, but the mood in Secretary Rumsfeld’s Office was
“much
tougher”.182
Mr Richard
Perle, Chairman of the Defence Advisory Board, whom Sir
Kevin
regarded as
one of the “most influential figures” on Secretary Rumsfeld’s
thinking, was
“very
clearly talking of trying to encourage a sort of Northern Alliance
of Iraq”.183
179
Telegram
1684 Washington to FCO London, 8 December 2001, ‘Tebbit’s Visit to
Washington:
Wider War
Against Terrorism’.
180
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 10 December 2001, ‘Visit to
Washington 5-7 December’.
181
Minute
Wilson to PS/CDI, 13 December 2001, ‘Iraq: Is there a “Northern
Alliance”?’
182
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 4.
183
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 4.
377