3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
416.
The FCO
reminded Mr Blair that the US was “reluctant to go down the
road
of
clarification” because of fears it represented a “slippery slope
towards a weaker
inspections
regime”. No Security Council member had “yet challenged this”,
although
the FCO
predicted that “pressure may increase” following the talks between
Iraq and
Mr Annan
on 7 March. “Nearly all of Iraq’s serious points” had related to
clarification; and
Mr Annan
expected the Security Council “to provide answers” before the next
round of
talks in
April. The US would “not be able to hold out against beginning
clarification talks
for much
longer without appearing unreasonable”.
417.
The FCO
advised that the UK “would be willing to see some clarification” as
long
as this did
not water down Iraq’s obligations or cut across UNMOVIC’s mandate
or
rights.
That included:
•
“Elaboration
of post-suspension financial controls, i.e. how much, if
any,
control of
the Iraqi economy, including oil revenues, should revert to the
Iraqi
government
once sanctions are suspended.”
•
“Definition of
key remaining disarmament tasks”.
•
“Clarification/shortening
of the suspension timetable”.
•
“Clarification
of the triggers for suspension, i.e. what is meant by
full
co‑operation
with the inspectors.”
418.
The FCO
advised that the US would “resist strongly any attempt to lower
the
barrier for
Iraqi compliance” and they “could even seek to raise it”. That
probably
meant that
the US would adopt an “extreme position” and Russia was “likely to
take
the
opposite extreme”. The FCO predicted that France might support the
UK because
it saw a
“Security Council agreement on a tough inspection regime as the
only realistic
alternative
to US military action”.
419.
The FCO also
explained that UNMOVIC had been given “all UNSCOM’s
responsibilities,
rights and resources”. It had additionally been tasked “with
establishing
a
reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, under
which outstanding
disarmament
issues would be addressed”. UNMOVIC and the IAEA were also
asked
to “draw up
a list of key disarmament tasks and to report on the level of
co-operation”
they had
received “so that the Security Council” could “judge whether the
conditions for
sanctions
suspension” had been met.
“Neither
SCR 687 or any subsequent resolutions contain any provision
for
ending … monitoring
and verification, even after sanctions lift. It is our
interpretation
that ending
monitoring would require a separate decision by the Security
Council,
hence …
Iraq could be subjected to special scrutiny indefinitely, until we
were
completely
satisfied that it no longer posed a threat.”
461