10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
11.
In the event,
those scenarios did not materialise. The preparations for
large‑scale
humanitarian
assistance made by the international community and, in the South,
by the
UK military
were not tested.
12.
By the middle
of April 2003, DFID was beginning to look beyond
humanitarian
assistance
to recovery and reconstruction.
13.
When military
operations against Iraq began, there was no single Ministerial
lead
for
reconstruction in Iraq. Mr Jack Straw (the Foreign Secretary), Mr
Geoff Hoon (the
Defence
Secretary) and Ms Clare Short (the International Development
Secretary)
remained
jointly responsible for directing post‑conflict planning and
preparation.
14.
Ms Short told
DFID officials on 26 March 2003 that Mr Blair had given
her
responsibility
for reconstruction in Iraq.
15.
The following
day, Sir Michael Jay, FCO Permanent Under Secretary,
and
Sir Andrew
Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary, agreed that “it was right that the
FCO
should take
the overall Whitehall lead on reconstruction”, including a
Cabinet
Committee on
reconstruction chaired by Mr Straw.2
Sir Michael
reported his concern
that DFID
were “still hankering after the leadership of the Iraq
reconstruction agenda”.
16.
In early
April, Mr Blair agreed to the creation of the Ad Hoc Ministerial
Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR), chaired by Mr Straw, “to formulate policy for the
rehabilitation,
reform and
development of Iraq”.3
The first
meeting took place on 10 April.
17.
The Cabinet
Office provided secretariat support for the AHMGIR but
responsibility
for
inter‑departmental co‑ordination remained with the
IPU.
18.
The creation
of the AHMGIR offered the possibility of a more strategic
and
integrated
UK approach to reconstruction, with a single Minister overseeing
the
development
and implementation of reconstruction strategy and planning. But it
should
have been
established earlier, to better support more coherent UK planning
and
preparations
for the post‑conflict period.
19.
Although the
AHMGIR commissioned and agreed a number of strategies
and
plans, it
did not seek to manage them. It did not, for example, scrutinise
and challenge
departments’
support for them, ensure that the structures and resources
necessary to
deliver
them were in place, or require substantive reports on progress and
impact.
20.
In May 2003,
following the resignation of Ms Short and the adoption of
resolution
1483, DFID
assumed leadership of the UK’s reconstruction effort in Iraq and
would
subsequently
define, within the framework established by the AHMGIR and
successive
2
Minute Jay
to Secretary of State [FCO], 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction:
Whitehall Co‑ordination’.
3
Letter
Turnbull to Straw, 7 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
Rehabilitation’.
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