The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
435.
In a Statement
by the President of the Security Council, issued after
consultations
on
Mr Butler’s report on 22 December, the Council reiterated
its demand that Iraq
co-operate
fully with UNSCOM and allow inspection teams “immediate,
unconditional
access”,
and stated that any failure to do so would be “unacceptable and a
clear
violation
of the relevant resolutions”. The Council also acknowledged that
discussions on
the
practical arrangements were continuing, reiterated its full support
for the Commission
and
Mr Butler, and called on the Government of Iraq to co-operate
fully.170
436.
On
12 January 1998, the Government of Iraq announced that, on the
basis of
the nationalities
present, a team would not be permitted to conduct further
inspections
437.
On
14 January, the President of the Security Council issued a
further statement
deploring
the Iraqi statement of 12 January and its “subsequent failure
to fulfil its
obligations
to provide the Special Commission with full, unconditional, and
immediate
access to
all sites”. The Council determined that “failure” was “unacceptable
and a clear
violation
of the relevant resolutions”.172
•
recalled
its statement of 29 October 1997 condemning Iraq’s decision to
try to
dictate the
terms of its compliance with its obligations to co-operate with
UNSCOM;
•
reiterated
its demand in resolution 1137 for co-operation;
•
expressed
its full support for the Special Commission and its
Executive
Chairman;
and
•
requested a
“full briefing” from Mr Butler after his planned talks with
Iraq so that
it could
“decide as necessary on the appropriate response”.
439.
On
15 January, the IAEA’s report of its visit to Iraq in December
was made
available
to the Security Council.173
The purpose
of the visit had been to clarify five
points
identified in paragraph 75 of the earlier report,
specifically:
•
“…
information provided by Iraq in respect of its post-war procurement
procedures
will
contribute to the ability of IAEA to identify actions that might
indicate Iraq’s
clandestine
procurement of proscribed or dual-use equipment and
materials.”
•
“The
specification of the scope and content for the summary of the
technical
achievements
of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme that IAEA handed
to
170
UN Security
Council, 22 December 1997, ‘Statement by the President of the
Security Council’
(S/PRST/1997/56).
171
UN Security
Council, 16 April 1998, ‘Report of the Executive Chairman on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1998/332).
172
UN Security
Council, 14 January 1998, ‘Statement by the President of the
Security Council’
(S/PRST/1998/1).
173
UN Security
Council, 15 January 1998, ‘Report on the International Atomic
Energy Agency technical
team visit
to Iraq, 19 to 31 December 1997’ (S/1998/38).
102