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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
of the discussion he was going to have with his colleagues. Looking at the record,
it looks as if that’s the only thing I was bothered about, and that gives a slightly
misleading impression.
“I think he did have those discussions with colleagues. The record is not entirely
clear, but Ministers clearly had a very serious discussion in the period 16-18
January, but it doesn’t seem to have been a formal meeting.”94
265.  Sir Kevin added:
“In my own calculations, I didn’t feel particularly comfortable about it. I mean,
we are talking about this purely from the point of view of how important we were
to the Americans.
“… [M]y own evidence may seem certainly slanted because of the way in which the
documents were around and have fallen, and I can’t find the note that I wrote to
Geoff Hoon over Christmas.
“I think we need to remember … The main purpose of our military build-up was to
help convince them [Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis] that we were in deadly earnest
… and that they would do much better to pursue the UN route and disarm and allow
the inspectors back, and then none of this military action would be necessary.
“So the most important objective … was … to have a real impact on Iraqi
perceptions … It was not the most important thing to actually have impact on
American perceptions. That was obviously a vital thing, but … a secondary issue.
It wasn’t the first thing I thought about.
“… [I]n that sense it didn’t make much difference whether we were going to the
North or the South, but frankly I thought the North would have more effect on Iraqi
perceptions if we could have achieved it …”95
266.  Asked whether there was any high level discussion across Whitehall of the issues
he had raised in his minute of 14 January, Sir Kevin replied:
“No, I don’t think so … the context is important here. My discussion with Geoff Hoon
before that was much wider, and it covered the whole range of issues in terms of
what were our basic interests and what were we trying to achieve, and the risks
of carrying on without a full Ministerial discussion.
“He [Mr Hoon] simply asked me personally to give him my fullest view about the
nature of the US/UK relationship in all its aspects, not to consult anyone, entirely
privately, because he wanted to have all the information that might be necessary
at his fingertips, should he get into the type of discussion with his colleagues.
94  Private hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 19-20.
95  Private hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 21-22.
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