The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“Eliza [Manningham-Buller] gave a very gloomy picture of the terrorist scene here,

said that even though Al Qaida were not directly linked to Iraq, they would use

an attack on Iraq to step up activity here. TB [Mr Blair] was looking really worried

at that point.”45

176. Mr Campbell added that Mr Blair had “said he had no doubt that trying to

remove Saddam quickly in the event of action was the best way, but he wanted to

know what he was in for”. C and Mr Scarlett had “said that there were suggestions that

the Republican Guard were to be kept out of Baghdad because Saddam didn’t trust

them fully”.

177. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment of 10 February reiterated

earlier warnings, described in Section 3.5, that:

• Al Qaida and associated networks would remain the greatest terrorist

threat to the UK and its activity would increase at the onset of any military

action against Iraq.

• In the event of imminent regime collapse, Iraqi chemical and biological

material could be transferred to terrorists, including Al Qaida.

178. At the request of the MOD and the FCO, on 10 February the JIC assessed

“broader terrorist activity that would be triggered by war with Iraq”.46

179. The JIC’s Key Judgements were:

“• The threat from Al Qaida will increase at the onset of any military action

against Iraq. They will target Coalition forces and other Western interests in

the Middle East. Attacks against Western interests elsewhere are also likely,

especially in the US and UK, for maximum impact. The worldwide threat from

other Islamist terrorist groups and individuals will increase significantly.

• Al Qaida associates and sympathisers may well attempt chemical or biological

terrorist attacks in the Gulf, including against UK civilian targets there, in the

event of war with Iraq. While individual attacks are likely to be small-scale they

may be numerous. Individual attacks might inflict relatively few casualties, but

will cause significant alarm.

• Al Qaida associated terrorists in Iraq and in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone

in Northern Iraq could conduct attacks against Coalition forces and interests

during, or in the aftermath of, war with Iraq. But Al Qaida will not carry out

attacks under Iraqi direction.

45 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

46 JIC Assessment, 10 February 2003, ‘International Terrorism: War with Iraq’.

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