9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
430.
Members of
DOP(I) also discussed an MOD paper on the UK’s contribution
to
the
“overall Iraq security strategy”.199
The paper
identified the different strategic end
states
adopted by the UK Government and the MNF-I (see Section 9.3), and
defined the
following
as key outcomes:
•
delivering
security in the run up to the December 2005 elections (the
immediate
focus);
•
delivering
a secure environment in MND(SE) which permitted training of
the
ISF to the
point that they can take on responsibility for security (the
short-term
focus);
and
•
delivering
Iraqi Security Force “self-reliance” (the medium-term
focus).
431.
The MOD said
that those outcomes would be achieved through a
cross‑departmental
effort, focused on: establishing a secure environment;
transitioning
tactical,
operational and strategic overwatch; developing an effective and
self-sufficient
IPS; and
building the capacity of key Ministries within the security
sector.
432.
At the DOP(I)
meeting, Sir Nigel Sheinwald handed Dr Reid’s letter
of
10 November
on transition in Muthanna and Maysan to
Mr Blair.200
433.
Dr Reid told
members of DOP(I) that the UK’s exit from Muthanna and
Maysan
had been
delayed until May 2006, reflecting the UK’s commitment to the
Japanese.201
Dr Reid
hoped it would be possible to complete the handover within this
timescale in
order to
start reducing the UK’s troop commitment in Iraq during
2006.
434.
Members of
DOP(I) were also given a paper on the ‘Iraq Communications
Strategy
for the UK
Audience’, which was not discussed at the meeting.202
435.
The paper
recorded the creation of the Iraq Communications Group
(Ministerial),203
which
brought together No.10, DFID, the FCO and the MOD to co-ordinate
the Iraq
message for
the domestic audience.
“… there
are relatively few resources dedicated specifically to Iraq
communications.
This is a
poor reflection of the magnitude of the issue and its importance to
HMG
and needs
to change.”
199
Paper MOD
officials, [undated], ‘Strategy for the UK’s Contribution to Iraq
Security’.
200
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald on Letter Reid
to Blair, 10 November 2005, [untitled].
201
Minutes, 15
November 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
202
Paper,
[undated], ‘Update on the Iraq Communications Strategy for the UK
Audience’ attaching ‘Iraq –
Core
Script’ and ‘Core Script’.
203
This group
was not a Cabinet Sub-Committee.
561