1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
97.
Devising such
a package should allow P5 unity to be restored, but was likely
to
mean
persuading the US “that some of their ideas for
punishing/over-throwing Saddam
will have
to be kept in reserve for now”.
98.
Mr Westmacott
offered a number of detailed suggestions for this
package,
including:
•
a new,
concerted effort to address oil smuggling;
•
elaboration
of how controls over oil revenues and imports could be relaxed
after
the
suspension of sanctions;
•
narrower
and deeper sanctions, for as long as Iraq did not comply
with
resolution 1284;
and
•
incorporation
of the NFZs into the package “on the basis of regional
security
needs … as
well as humanitarian protection”. That would be useful “given
the
problems at
the London end over the maintenance of NFZ aerial
patrols”.
99.
Mr Westmacott
stated that such a package would require a new resolution,
and
commented:
“But the
best chance of getting agreement to a new resolution would lie
in
retaining
[resolution] 1284 as the basis of the revised approach. The package
itself
nonetheless
needs to be crafted in the expectation that Saddam will not
comply.
So it needs
to be forthcoming enough to command P5 support but firm
enough
to remain
relevant in the likely event that the carrots it contains fail to
deliver
Iraqi
compliance.”
100.
Mr Peter
Gooderham, Counsellor in the British Embassy Washington, wrote
to
Mr Westmacott
on 5 February to report on Mr Cook’s “briefing supper” in
Washington.58
Mr Cook had
told officials that:
“…
[resolution] 1284 was no longer sustainable. It made sense, not
least in
UNSC‑handling
terms, to keep it on the table … we should accept that
Saddam
had no
intention of complying with it. We should give up, therefore, the
effort to get
inspectors
back into Iraq, and embark instead on a set of policies which did
not
depend on
Iraqi co-operation for their sustainability.”
101.
Mr Cook had
outlined a new package, comprising:
•
targeting
sanctions at military and dual-use items: that would mean
the
US taking a
less restrictive approach on contract “holds”;
•
keeping
financial controls in place, but seeking ways of facilitating
the
reconstruction
of Iraqi infrastructure, in particular the oil
industry;
•
clamping
down on smuggling;
58
Letter
Gooderham to Westmacott, 5 February 2001, ‘Iraq: Policy Review:
Foreign Secretary’s Visit’.
209