The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1422.
In February
2002, Mr Sawers identified a number of questions that would
need
asking of
the US if the UK associated itself with a policy of regime change,
including:
“How would
we keep the Iranians from meddling?” 628
1423.
On 5 August,
the JIC assessed that, after a US attack began, “Iran
would
probably
boost its support for Shia groups working against Saddam”. The
Islamic
Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) “would be likely to work directly to
undermine
US
influence, eg by manipulating Iraqi groups through propaganda and
the selective
provision
of money and arms, although it would not provoke anything that
would provoke
US military
retaliation”.629
1424.
In September,
Mr Chaplin wrote in an internal FCO minute that the job
of
the
Coalition would be to ensure stability, including “preventing
interference from
neighbours,
especially Iran”.630
1425.
The FCO paper
‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after Saddam’, sent to
No.10
on 26
September, judged that Iraq’s neighbours might find it difficult
not to get sucked
in, and
included an explicit reference to Iran as the neighbour most likely
to become
1426.
Mr Hoon’s
advice to Mr Blair on 16 January 2003 stated that the UK
military plan
would need
further development to address a number of specific challenges,
including
1427.
The 19
February JIC Assessment ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in Store?’ stated
that
Iran might
support small-scale cross-border interventions by armed groups and
that
the IRGC
would “continue to meddle in southern Iraq”. Iranian reactions to a
Coalition
presence in
southern Iraq were unclear, but “unlikely to be
aggressive”.633
Iran’s
aims
in response
to a Coalition presence in Iraq included ensuring a leading role
for its allies
among the
Iraqi Shia (the Supreme Council for an Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) and
its armed
wing the Badr Corps).
1428.
In response to
a request from Mr Blair for advice on the implications of the
JIC
Assessment
and the Adelphi Paper, the FCO advised that the key to preventing a
Shia
uprising
would be:
“… to
assure the varied Shia communities that they will be fairly
represented in
future Iraq
… Much will also depend on the length of a Coalition
‘occupation’.
628
Teleletter
Sawers to Jay, 21 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Policy’.
629
JIC
Assessment, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes and Impact of
Military Action’.
630
Minute
Chaplin to Gray, 13 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Post-Saddam
Issues’.
631
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the future
of Iraq after Saddam’
attaching
Paper FCO, ‘Scenarios for the future of Iraq after
Saddam’.
632
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land
Contribution’.
633
JIC
Assessment, 19 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq: What’s in
Store?’
560