The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

541. In March 2009, with the departure of the DFID Head of the PRT and the transition

to US leadership, DFID authority for moves off the COB was transferred to the Head of

DFID Baghdad.356

542. Comments from witnesses who served in Iraq reinforced the impression of slowly

improving transport provision.

543. Mr Tansley, Consul General in Basra from October 2005 to April 2006, told

the Inquiry: “The thing that dominated our lives, was not money and people. It was

helicopters.” 357

544. Mr Asquith, British Ambassador to Iraq from August 2006 to August 2007, told the

Inquiry that transport constraints inhibited movement between Baghdad and Basra:

“Not merely was it difficult to get down there, since we were dependent, at that

stage, upon helicopter trips out of Baghdad to the airport and then to Basra, and

the military facilities weren’t always ready for that …

“It was also difficult to move around Basra …” 358

545. Ms Kathleen Reid, Head of DFID Basra from August 2007 to September 2008,

explained that:

“[Major] General [Barney] White‑Spunner [GOC MND(SE)] … made a commitment

… that they were there to support. Whatever we needed in terms of assets, he

would make that happen, and I have to say, always came good on that …” 359

546. Mr Prentice, British Ambassador from September 2007 to November 2009, stated:

“… if we wanted to get to Basra, we needed to have a military asset. Under our

duty of care regulations, we couldn’t use the emerging commercial flights, which

towards the end of my period were available … So we had to depend on helicopters

and military lift. But during my time we also had use of US civilian aircraft through

the US Embassy. They kindly made those available to us occasionally. So physical

movement to and from Basra I would say was improving during my time but was

still difficult.” 360

547. In October 2008, FCO officials started to consider the future of the UK’s network

of posts in Iraq after the military drawdown in 2009.361 The preferred option was to

maintain the status quo in Baghdad and Erbil, with a reduced presence in Basra, in

order to strike “the right balance between strategic policy delivery requirements and

financial pressures”.

356 Minute Lowcock on Minute MacKiggan to Lowcock, 30 March 2009, ‘Iraq: Basra Off‑COB Movements

Approval’.

357 Private hearing, 22 June 2010, page 72.

358 Public hearing, 4 December 2009, page 28.

359 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 30.

360 Public hearing, 6 January 2010, pages 4‑5.

361 Paper Iraq Group, October 2008, ‘Iraq Strategy from 2009: Implications for FCO’.

340