The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
much on the
Rumsfeld end of the market at the moment. CDS was a bit
more
engaged.
David felt that the US were in a very different
position.”457
1173.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office wrote to Mr Rycroft on 12 December,
recommending
a more
pro‑active media strategy to explain the military
preparations.458
That
included
a proposal
for a background briefing for defence correspondents and a briefing
for
“talking
heads” on 17 December.
1174.
Notwithstanding
continuing uncertainties over Turkey’s position, PJHQ
advised on
9 December that ground operations might begin sooner
than
had
previously been anticipated and sought endorsement for a role for
the
Amphibious
Task Group early in the campaign.
1175.
The
possibility of deploying a Royal Marine Commando Group was first
identified
by
Maj Gen Fry on 30 August 2002 when he advised that “a
timely effect in the South
could
probably only be achieved by the ARG in support of the US MEF
[Marine
Expeditionary
Force]”.459
1176.
Advice
submitted to the Chiefs of Staff on 19 September
stated:
“Within the
maritime element of Package 2 the Amphibious Ready Group
with
an embarked
Commando offers a high readiness, flexible small scale
land
contribution …
[T]his force package can be sustained throughout, provided it
is
integrated
with USMC [US Marine Corps] forces, and does not proceed beyond
a
point from
which it can be sustained from … afloat resources. This clearly
restricts
its
operational utility, but does present an opportunity for ‘boots on
the ground’, if the
UK decision
is not to commit beyond Package 2.”460
1177.
Mr Watkins
informed No.10 on 20 September that further work, on whether
it
would be
possible to include a Commando Group in Package 2, was under
way.461
1178.
By the middle
of October, the Commando Group had been incorporated
into
1179.
On 9 December,
Lt Gen Reith put forward a proposal seeking COS
“endorsement
for” an
early role for the Amphibious Task Group in operations against
Iraq.463
457
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
458
Letter
Williams to Rycroft, 12 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning –
Presentational Strategy’.
459
Minute Fry
to DCDS(C), 30 August 2002, ‘PJHQ Update on Planning for Operations
Against Iraq’.
460
Paper SPG,
19 September 2002, ‘Iraq Package Options – Military Strategy
Commentary’.
461
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any Military Action’.
462
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK
Contingency Planning’.
463
Minute CJO
to COSSEC, 9 December 2002, ‘Contingent Operations by the UK
Amphibious Task Group’.
352