6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003

955. On 10 March, Mr Brenton had reported that “a commercial contact” had passed

the British Embassy Washington a version of a USAID invitation to select US companies

to bid for a US$600m contract for infrastructure reconstruction.407 USAID had confirmed

that the invitation had been issued on 12 February with a closing date of 27 February.

Mr Brenton had pressed for more transparency.

956. Mr Brenton also reported that it was not clear how that USAID contract related to a

separate contract “allegedly being let by the US Army Corps of Engineers” and reported

in the UK press on 9 March.

957. That contract, the US$7bn contract for “repair work on Iraq’s oil sector” awarded

to US engineering firm KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton, by the US Army Corps of

Engineers on 8 March, later emerged as the single largest reconstruction contract

in Iraq.408

958. On 13 March, during his visit to Washington, Mr O’Brien lobbied Mr Andrew

Natsios, USAID Administrator, for UK companies to be awarded reconstruction

contracts.409 Mr Natsios advised that, for security reasons, USAID had invited only a few

US companies with the necessary clearances to bid for the 17 primary reconstruction

contracts. There were no such constraints on subcontracts, and he hoped that UK

companies and NGOs with the right expertise would be successful in securing those

contracts. In response to a question from Mr O’Brien, Mr Natsios said that it would

be possible for UK companies to acquire the necessary security clearances to bid

for primary contracts.

959. Mr O’Brien also lobbied the European Directorate of the NSC on oil contracts.410

He accepted that it was reasonable for US companies to be the recipients of DoD money

for emergency contracts to repair damage to oil infrastructure, but the field should be

opened up “once Iraqi money came on stream”. The NSC official agreed.

960. On 14 March, Mr Straw commented on Baroness Symons’s minute, described

earlier in this Section, in which she drew attention to concerns in the UK business

community about the level of the Government’s engagement with the US on commercial

issues. Mr Straw stated: “This is really important.”411 His office instructed Mr Chilcott to

factor Baroness Symons’s concerns into the IPU’s follow-up to Mr O’Brien’s discussions

in Washington.412

407 Telegram 320 Washington to FCO London, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: Infrastructure

Reconstruction Contracts’.

408 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

409 Telegram 341 Washington to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq Day After: Mr O’Brien’s Visit’.

410 Letter Gooderham to Chilcott, 13 March 2003, Iraq: Day After: The Oil Sector’.

411 Manuscript comment Straw, 14 March 2003, on Minute Symons to Straw and Hewitt, [undated],

‘Iraq: Commercial Aspects’.

412 Minute McDonald to Chilcott, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Commercial Aspects’.

485