The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
non‑official
civilians were lengthy; that these had to be followed by
pre‑deployment
training
which was only intermittently available; and that, crucially,
departments’ duty
of care
constrained recruitment … [I]n these circumstances, “as fast as
possible”
was simply
not fast enough.” 379
576.
In his memoir,
Sir Hilary described the shortage of human resources and
expertise
as “the
greatest single deficiency of our civilian operation”:
“It is now
clear that there were two main reasons for this. Partly it was a
result of
the
excessive priority which was, and still is, placed on the security
of civilian public
servants
…
“But a more
fundamental reason for the short supply of personnel and
other
resources
stemmed from a lack of political direction … The Army could, as
always,
be relied
upon to find solutions for themselves, albeit cut according to
their
overstretched
means. But in the civilian domain, Blair’s exhortations and
verbal
commitments
were not reflected in exceptional measures such as identifying
and
encouraging
volunteers by means of trawls of Embassies around the world,
fast‑track
recruitment
procedures, or new management and co‑ordination systems
across
government
departments.” 380
577.
Mr James
Tansley, Consul General in Basra from October 2005 to April
2006,
told the
Inquiry:
“Under our
current terms and conditions of service you can’t tell someone in
the
Foreign
Office to go to Basra. It’s a voluntary thing, and that was the
Foreign Office’s
policy. No
matter how you present it, being told you are going to be sitting
in a
fortified
camp, being mortared every evening and probably not seeing daylight
for
a number of
– not so much daylight, but not seeing the outside world for six
weeks
at a time,
is not a particularly good sell, particularly if you feel that no
one in London
appreciates
what you are doing.381
578.
Asked whether
he had the right team to do what was needed, Mr Tansley
replied:
“The
incentives weren’t there.”
579.
Ms Lindy
Cameron, Deputy Head of DFID Baghdad from January to
November
2004 and
Head of DFID Iraq from November 2004 to August 2005, told the
Inquiry:
“Late 2003
before I got there and early 2004, it was quite hard for us to get
the right
people.
It’s important not to underestimate the impact that the bombing of
the Canal
Hotel had
on willingness of staff to come and work in Iraq … I recall having
to brief
staff
before they arrived that they had to be aware that friends and
family would be
379
Telegram 10
CPA Basra to FCO London, 26 January 2004, ‘Basra Valedictory’
[Parts 1 and 2].
380
Synnott
H. Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. I B
Tauris & Co
Ltd.,
2008.
381
Private
hearing, 22 June 2010, page 72.
346