The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

627. A Cabinet Office update for Ministers on 14 August reflected the same analysis:

“… the Basra demonstrations are evidence of increasing frustration with the

Coalition’s failure to restore basic services. Attacks on MND(SE) are widening.”347

628. Sir Hilary Synnott wrote in his memoir:

“… Riots erupted outside our Electricity Accounts building. Instead of just stones and

rocks, there was now gunfire …

… Within a day, however, the Army had stepped in to organise the fuel distribution

network … The violence subsided to a normal level as quickly as it had blown up.”348

629. Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments),

advised the Chiefs of Staff on 18 August:

“Iraqi consent to the Coalition presence in MND(SE) is declining because supplies

of fuel, power and water are failing to meet expectations.”349

630. He reported that UK troops were being diverted to “fuel security” tasks;

19 Mechanised Brigade was now dedicating four patrols to fuel security tasks for

every one patrol to general security tasks.

631. Lt Gen Fry identified three courses of action for the UK:

• accelerate reconstruction by the CPA;

• step in to lead the reconstruction effort in MND(SE); or

• step in temporarily to alleviate the situation, before handing over to the

CPA/Iraqi ministries.

632. Lt Gen Fry concluded that if an acceleration of the CPA’s reconstruction effort did

not check the deterioration, then a shift to the third course of action would be essential.

633. The Chiefs of Staff meeting on 20 August agreed that the first course of action

should be pursued, although contingency planning should be undertaken for the third

course of action.350

634. An update for the AHMGIR, produced on 20 August, advised that Basra was now

calmer, although that calm might be “short-lived if the Coalition cannot maintain at least

the current level of service delivery”.351 Security across MND(SE) remained volatile, and

security concerns had led to the withdrawal of Japanese staff in CPA(South).

347 Letter Drummond to Owen, 14 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers’ attaching Paper Cabinet Office,

14 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers, 14 August 2003’.

348 Synnott H. Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq. I B Tauris & Co

Ltd., 2008.

349 Minute DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 18 August 2003, ‘Essential services in MND(SE)’.

350 Minutes, 20 August 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

351 Paper Cabinet Office, 20 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers, 21 August 2003’.

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