The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Iraq’s
security and intelligence agencies have been monitoring UNMOVIC and
the
IAEA and
plans are available to obstruct them if they come close to WMD
itself …
Iraq is
particularly concerned about … interviews of scientists and others
because if
they were
carried out as mandated by [resolution] 1441 they would
unquestionably
expose the
regime’s deception and its stockpile of weapons … In early December
we
know that
Saddam Hussein issued instructions that scientists were to be
threatened
with
serious consequences for themselves and their families if they
revealed
any
sensitive information to UNMOVIC. They were ordered not to agree to
any
interviews
taking place outside Iraq … The potential witnesses have been
coached
in the
answers they have to give. Some of them have been removed from
their
homes and
places of work and detained to prevent them from being
interviewed.”
“… we can
expect Iraq will continue trickling out so-called concessions, one
at
a time, at
the last minute to split the Security Council and buy more time
while
continuing
an active policy of concealment; to start trickling out ‘newly
discovered’
documents
as part of a co-ordinated plan to tie down UNMOVIC on what the
regime
considers
to be expendable parts of its WMD programme. We can also expect
Iraq
soon to
announce that interviews may take place unaccompanied
…”
927.
Mr Straw
concluded that it was clear that:
“… Saddam
Hussein believes he can once again divide and outwit the
international
community
through a pretence of co-operation. We cannot afford to send him
…
any signal,
that he is close to success … He is also hoping that he final
opportunity,
which was
originally afforded to him 12 years ago and then repeated by 1441,
was
not final
at all …”
928.
Mr Straw
was asked a series of questions by Mr Donald Anderson,
the Chairman
of the
Committee, about the legality of military action without a second
resolution.
929.
Asked about
Mr Blair’s “escape clause” and whether the Government
“would
not feel
bound to await” a second resolution “or to abide by it if it were
to be vetoed
unreasonably”,
Mr Straw replied:
“The reason
why we have drawn a parallel with Kosovo is … it was not possible
to
get a
direct Security Council resolution and instead the Government and
those that
participated
in the action had to fall back on previous … resolutions and
general
international
law … to justify the action that was taken … We are satisfied that
we
have
sufficient legal authority in 1441 back to the originating
resolution 660 [1990] …
to justify
military action against Iraq if they are in further material
breach.”
930.
Mr Straw
added that was “clearly laid down and it was anticipated when we
put
1441
together”. The Government would “much prefer” military action, if
that proved
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