The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
764.
On 23
February, Mr Annan wrote to the President of the Security
Council to
report
Mr Brahimi’s findings from his first visit to
Iraq.423
Mr Brahimi
had identified three
conditions
which needed to be met before transitional elections could be
held:
•
a legal
framework;
•
an
institutional framework; and
•
availability
of the required resources.
765.
None of those
conditions existed in Iraq and Mr Brahimi assessed that, even
once
they did, a
minimum of eight months would be required to prepare for a credible
election.
He
therefore considered it was not possible to hold an election by 30
June 2004, when
the
transfer of sovereignty was due to take place.
766.
Mr Brahimi
therefore concluded that a provisional government would need to
be
formed by
30 June through some mechanism other than direct elections. He
considered
that while
the caucus-style system envisaged by the 15 November Agreement
was
one such
mechanism, it did not have enough support among Iraqis. Instead,
Iraqis
should work
together with the CPA and the UN to engage in a focused dialogue on
the
mechanism
to which sovereignty would be transferred on
30 June.
767.
More broadly,
Mr Brahimi judged that:
“There are
many indications of a growing fragmentation of the political
class.
Sectarianism
is becoming entrenched and inter-communal politics more
polarized,
all within
a context of a political process that remains limited to a few
actors, with
varying
credibility.”
768.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 24
February.424
Mr Blair
proposed that the Consultative Council should be large enough to
make it as
representative
as possible, allowing room for currently unrepresented elements of
the
Sunni
community.
769.
On 24 February
the UK/US also reported, for the third time, to the UN on
the
Coalition’s
activities in Iraq.425
770.
A telegram
from UKMIS New York, describing the report, quoted
Ambassador
Negroponte
telling the Security Council that:
“Resolving
the elections question now provided an opportunity for Iraqis and
the
CPA to
engage in a dialogue on the mechanism through which sovereignty
would
be
transferred on 30 June. The Iraqi people, the Governing Council,
the Coalition
423
Letter
Secretary-General to President of the Security Council, 23 February
2004 attaching Report ‘The
political
transition in Iraq: report of the fact finding
mission’.
424
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 24 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President
Bush, 24
February’.
425
Telegram
162 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 February 2004, ‘Iraq: UK/US
update to the Security
Council: 24
February’.
332