The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

400. The last meeting of DOP on Iraq before the 2003 conflict, however, took place

in March 1999.182

401. In April 2002, the MOD clearly expected consideration of military options to be

addressed through DOP. Mr Simon Webb, the MOD Policy Director, advised Mr Hoon

that:

“Even these preparatory steps would properly need a Cabinet Committee decision,

based on a minute from the Defence Secretary …”183

402. Most decisions on Iraq pre-conflict were taken either bilaterally between Mr Blair

and the relevant Secretary of State or in meetings between Mr Blair, Mr Straw and

Mr Hoon, with No.10 officials and, as appropriate, Mr John Scarlett (Chairman of the

JIC), Sir Richard Dearlove and Adm Boyce. Some of those meetings were minuted;

some were not.

403. As the guidance for the Cabinet Secretariat makes clear, the purpose of the minute

of a meeting is to set out the conclusions reached so that those who have to take

action know precisely what to do; the second purpose is to “give the reasons why the

conclusions were reached”.184

404. Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary from 2002 to 2005, described Mr Blair’s

characteristic way of working with his Cabinet colleagues as:

“… ‘I like to move fast. I don't want to spend a lot of time in kind of conflict resolution,

and, therefore, I will get the people who will make this thing move quickly and

efficiently.’ That was his sort of characteristic style, but it has drawbacks.”185

405. Lord Turnbull subsequently told the Inquiry that the group described above was

“a professional forum … they had … with one possible exception [Ms Clare Short, the

International Development Secretary], the right people in the room. It wasn’t the kind

of sofa government in the sense of the Prime Minister and his special advisers and

political cronies”.186

406. In July 2004, Lord Butler’s Report stated that his Committee was:

“… concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the Government’s

procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing

the scope for informed collective political judgement. Such risks are particularly

significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts are inherently

182 Email Cabinet Office to Secretary Iraq Inquiry, 5 July 2011, ‘FOI request for joint MOD/FCO memo

on Iraq Policy 1999’.

183 Minute Webb to PS/Secretary of State, 12 April 2002, ‘Bush and the War on Terrorism’.

184 Cabinet Office, June 2001, Guide to Minute Taking.

185 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 28.

186 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, pages 45-46.

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