The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
only to Mr
Watkins (for Mr Hoon), Admiral Boyce, Sir Michael Jay, Sir Richard
Dearlove,
Sir
Christopher Meyer and Mr Powell.221
572.
Much of the
discussion took place privately between the two leaders. Sir
David
Manning
recorded that the meeting on Saturday morning was
informed:
•
There was
no war plan for Iraq.
•
Thinking so
far had been on a broad, conceptual level.
•
A very
small cell in Central Command in Florida had recently been set
up
to do some
planning and to think through the various options.
•
When the US
had done that, US and UK planners would be able to sit
down
together to
examine the options.
•
The US and
UK would work through the issues together.
573.
Sir David
recorded that Mr Blair and President Bush had
discussed:
•
the need to
enhance not diminish regional stability;
•
who might
replace Saddam Hussein if action was taken to topple
him;
•
the impact
of a moderate, secular regime in Iraq on other countries in the
region;
•
the need to
manage public relations with great care;
•
putting
Saddam Hussein on the spot over UN inspections and seeking
proof
of the
claim that he was not developing WMD; and
•
the timing
of possible military action. If a decision was taken to use
military
action,
that would not take place before late 2002/early 2003.
574.
Mr Blair said
that it was important to go back to the United Nations and to
present
that as an
opportunity for Saddam Hussein to co-operate:
“… no one
could doubt that the world would be a better place if there were
regime
change in
Iraq. He was sure it was right to go the inspectors’ route. But we
would
have to
give careful thought about how we framed the ultimatum to Saddam to
allow
the
inspectors to do their job.”
575.
Mr Blair
thought that Saddam Hussein would probably try to obstruct the
inspectors
and play
for time. That was why it was so important that they must be
allowed in at
any time
and be free to visit any place or installation. He also identified
the need for an
accompanying
public relations strategy that highlighted both the risks of
Saddam’s WMD
programme
and his “appalling” human rights record, and the importance of
managing
European
public opinion and helping to construct an international
coalition.
576.
Mr Blair said
he would emphasise that Saddam was being given an opportunity
to
co-operate.
If “as he expected” Saddam failed to do so, it would be “very much
harder
221
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the
United States: 5-7 April’.
492