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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
only to Mr Watkins (for Mr Hoon), Admiral Boyce, Sir Michael Jay, Sir Richard Dearlove,
Sir Christopher Meyer and Mr Powell.221
572.  Much of the discussion took place privately between the two leaders. Sir David
Manning recorded that the meeting on Saturday morning was informed:
There was no war plan for Iraq.
Thinking so far had been on a broad, conceptual level.
A very small cell in Central Command in Florida had recently been set up
to do some planning and to think through the various options.
When the US had done that, US and UK planners would be able to sit down
together to examine the options.
The US and UK would work through the issues together.
573.  Sir David recorded that Mr Blair and President Bush had discussed:
the need to enhance not diminish regional stability;
who might replace Saddam Hussein if action was taken to topple him;
the impact of a moderate, secular regime in Iraq on other countries in the region;
the need to manage public relations with great care;
putting Saddam Hussein on the spot over UN inspections and seeking proof
of the claim that he was not developing WMD; and
the timing of possible military action. If a decision was taken to use military
action, that would not take place before late 2002/early 2003.
574.  Mr Blair said that it was important to go back to the United Nations and to present
that as an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to co-operate:
“… no one could doubt that the world would be a better place if there were regime
change in Iraq. He was sure it was right to go the inspectors’ route. But we would
have to give careful thought about how we framed the ultimatum to Saddam to allow
the inspectors to do their job.”
575.  Mr Blair thought that Saddam Hussein would probably try to obstruct the inspectors
and play for time. That was why it was so important that they must be allowed in at
any time and be free to visit any place or installation. He also identified the need for an
accompanying public relations strategy that highlighted both the risks of Saddam’s WMD
programme and his “appalling” human rights record, and the importance of managing
European public opinion and helping to construct an international coalition.
576.  Mr Blair said he would emphasise that Saddam was being given an opportunity to
co-operate. If “as he expected” Saddam failed to do so, it would be “very much harder
221  Letter Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the United States: 5-7 April’.
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