The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
309.
Cabinet Office
officials also set out UK objectives for a new Security
Council
resolution.
They were:
•
to broaden
the UN Special Representative’s role, especially on
the
political process;
•
to ask the
GC to set a timetable for elections;
•
to
encourage international engagement with the GC;
•
to
stimulate funding for reconstruction; and
•
to
encourage contributions of troops and police, “without undermining
the legal
basis of
our current military presence (a significant
caveat)”.188
310.
Mr Straw
told the AHMGIR when it met on 28 August that:
“… the US
and UK had seized the opportunity, provided by the
international
solidarity
following the UN bombing, to work on a new UN resolution. There
was
UN consensus
on the need for a strengthened UN mandate for military
forces
in Iraq,
and that they should operate under single command but not be
a
blue-hatted
operation.”189
311.
FCO officials
told the meeting that secularists wanted a slow political
timetable
in Iraq but
Islamists a quicker one, believing they would benefit from early
elections.
Mr Neil
Crompton, who had succeeded Mr Chilcott as the Head of the
Iraq Policy Unit,
described
progress as “limited”.
312.
On 28 August
Mr Crompton advised Mr Straw’s Private Secretary
that:
“… there is
a head of steam within the MOD about the lack of progress
on
reconstruction.
As the military see it, CPA in general, and CPA(South) in
particular,
have failed
to deliver. As a result, the Coalition is losing consent, the
military are
having to
take on tasks which should be undertaken by civilians, and in the
process
the
military are becoming over-stretched and
vulnerable.”190
313.
A letter from
Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary of the same date confirmed
this
assessment.
It reported the MOD’s view that:
“The nub of
the problem is the failure to deliver an adequate (even to
pre-war
standards)
level of essential services … electricity, water and
fuel.”191
314.
On 29 August,
Sir Nigel Sheinwald, successor to Sir David Manning as
Mr Blair’s
Foreign
Policy Adviser, updated Mr Blair on Iraq.192
He attached
a Cabinet Office note
incorporating
the conclusions of the previous day’s meeting of the
AHMGIR.
188 Annotated
Agenda, 28 August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
189
Minutes, 28
August 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
190
Minute
Crompton to PS [FCO], 28 August 2003, ‘Ad Hoc
Ministerial’.
191
Letter
Williams to No.10 [junior official], 28 August 2003, ‘Iraq:
Situation in UK Area of Operations’.
192
Sheinwald
to Prime Minister, 29 August
2003, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note Cabinet Office, 29 August
2003,
‘Iraq:
Update 29 August 2003’.
260