The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
242.
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary added a covering note explaining that
Mr McDonald
and Ms
Aldred had discussed the issue with General Douglas Lute,
President Bush’s
adviser on
Iraq, who had confirmed that on balance the US was content
with
243.
Ms Aldred’s
advice was that it would be important to “keep a careful eye on
how
things
develop between now and handover” and to “establish clear and
consistent media
messages”.
Further advice was awaited from the MOD on operational handling
between
now and
PIC, including the part the UK would play in the event of any
intra-Shia or
sectarian
violence.
244.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 again
on
21 August.107
They
suggested that it was important not to be too fixated on
detainee
releases;
the cessation of hostilities was, at least from the UK side, every
bit as
important.
In their report back to London, the officials advised that the “MOD
POLAD
[Political
Adviser] here is preparing a submission that will seek transfer of
future authority
for
releases at the end of each month’s period (should the process
survive) from
SoS Defence
to GOC”.
245.
Maj Gen Binns
was reported to be “emphatically supportive” of the
negotiations:
“So
far.”
246.
A further long
meeting took place on 23 August, described by government
officials
working
closely with the military as “difficult”.108
A large
part of the meeting was spent
debating
further releases. JAM1 insisted that “there must be 15 releases on
30 August;
otherwise
our agreement was off”. Without the releases there would be huge
problems;
Basra would
become “another Fallujah”. The slow pace of releases was
damaging
JAM1’s
credibility.
247.
The officials
explained that “we had a deal and must stick to it” – the month
of
cease-fire
ended on 13 September. If the violence continued to reduce there
“should be
substantial
releases” then, but nothing could be promised yet.
106
Minute
Turner to Prime Minister, 22 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Handover of Basra
Palace’.
107
Email
government official working closely with the military, 22 August
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
21 August
Meeting with [JAM1]’.
108
Email
government official working closely with the military, 24 August
2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
23 August
Meeting with [JAM1]’.
228