The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
467.
The paper
defined the key elements for the coming year as:
•
building
the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces;
•
outreach by
the ITG to bring in those currently supporting the
insurgency;
•
drawing in
the international community and giving it a new sense of
purpose;
and
•
reviewing
reconstruction to find ways to make a difference
quickly.
468.
The paper
concluded that the UK should not increase force numbers in Iraq
and
should not
provide personnel for operations outside its current area of
operations.
Instead, it
should continue with the training effort in MND(SE), develop a
strategy for
the Iraqi
police service and offer support to the Iraqis in developing their
intelligence
capability,
and in maximising and co-ordinating international
assistance.
469.
According to
the paper, outreach to insurgents was primarily the responsibility
of
the ITG.
The UK and US should encourage the active involvement of Sunni
Arabs within
the ITG, a
relaxation of the de-Ba’athification rules and ensure that the
arrangements for
drafting
the Constitution were inclusive. Further work to accelerate
reconstruction was
also
essential, along with:
“… a
clear declaratory
plan for MNF drawdown, agreed
with the ITG, which
includes
milestones on the progressive handover to Iraqi control. It may
not, at this
stage,
require a timetable as such.”
470.
The Chairman’s
Brief produced for Mr Blair ahead of the meeting on 9
February
emphasised
the need to “task MOD to lead work with FCO and DFID to prepare
more
detailed
thinking on what we can offer” in relation to increasing the UK’s
contribution
on “training,
police policy, intelligence structures, and capacity
building”.254
471.
Mr Quarrey
advised Mr Blair to press Mr Hoon on the proposals for
Iraqiisation,
observing
that not all in the MOD were persuaded that the SSR effort should
focus on
developing
counter-insurgency capacity in the ISF, arguing instead that a
broader-based
generalist
capacity was more appropriate.255
472.
Mr Quarrey
also advised that Mr Blair should press for agreement on as
much
of the
detail in the strategy paper as possible, and that it should be
sent to the US as
“the basis
for a US/UK strategy review”.
473.
When it met on
9 February, the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq approved
the
strategy
paper and agreed that No.10 should share an updated version with
the US.256
254
Briefing
Cabinet Office, 9 February 2005, ‘Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting to be held in
the Cabinet
Room on Wednesday 9 February 2005 at 15:00: Chairman’s
Brief’.
255
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 8 February 2005, ‘Iraq: 2005
Strategy’.
256
Minutes, 9
February 2005, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
470