The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1439.
On 23
February, Mr Prentice discussed the security situation in
Basra with
Dr Rubaie,
who confirmed that an order replacing Gen Mohan had been
signed by Prime
Minister
Maliki based on a report that a “non‑interference pact” had been
signed with
JAM.1314
Mr Prentice
commented that the UK had some understanding of the
balance
that
Gen Mohan and Maj Gen Jalil had to strike in
handling the militias and that “It was
probably
wise not to seek a confrontation with JAM, while the army and
police were still
building
their strength.” Dr Rubaie observed that there was a
difference between calming
the
situation and fearing to confront it.
1440.
On 27
February, the JIC assessed security prospects in the
South:
“The Iraqi
security forces (ISF) ability and willingness to maintain security
in the
South
remains patchy and dependent on MNF training, logistic and
specialist air
support.
Radical improvements in police effectiveness are unlikely. The army
will
remain at
the forefront in providing security, relying on assistance from
units outside
the South
to cope with serious and sustained violence there. The Iraqis would
only
call for
MNF troop re‑intervention as a last resort.
“Violent
criminality, murders, kidnappings, score‑settling and intimidation
will remain
part of
life in southern Iraq. Pressure from national Shia political and
religious
leaders,
reinforced by some local political leaders and security officials,
may limit
the scope
of unrest. But local ISF action, accommodations between the ISF
and
elements of
JAM, and the perception of MNF willingness to intervene, will
also
remain
crucial tools for managing instability.”1315
1441.
The JIC
reported that, although reliable data for attacks against non‑MNF
targets
was
lacking, in Basra City alone there had been about 80 murders and 40
kidnappings.
Accounts in
the media suggested that Shia militia were increasingly punishing
and
sometimes
killing women for “contravening strict interpretations of Islamic
mores”.
Around 10
women were reportedly murdered each month in Basra
City.
1442.
Mr Brown
and Mr Browne had breakfast with the Chiefs of Staff on 6
March.1316
The Chiefs
told them that “there was quality in the ISF but it was not
broadening as
rapidly as
hoped, so training and mentoring of 14Div remained a vital
job”.
1443.
In late March,
Prime Minister Maliki launched a security operation in
Basra,
code‑named
Sawlat
al‑Fursan (Arabic for
“Charge of the Knights”). The operation had
wide‑ranging
effects on the UK’s position and standing in Iraq and is described
in detail
in Section
9.6.
1314
Email
Prentice to Betts, 24 February 2008, ‘Meeting with National
Security Adviser Rubaie,
23 February’.
1315
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Security Prospects in the
South’.
1316
Letter
Fletcher to Rimmer, 6 March 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Breakfast with
Chiefs of Staff, 6 March’.
388