The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Missile
programme: evidence of proscribed liquid and solid
propellant
development
projects that had not progressed beyond the design phase, with
no
evidence of
production.
•
CW: “some
encouraging leads particularly on VX”.
•
Nuclear:
the ISG had discovered that in 2002 the Iraqi Atomic
Energy
Commission
had obtained a balancing machine identified as the most
important
item for a
centrifuge programme. This indicated that Iraq’s nuclear
programme
might have
taken “a small but significant step forward” while sanctions were
in
place.
441.
Mr Scarlett
explained that the ISG expected to issue a classified progress
report to
the UK, US
and Australian Governments in mid-September. It was “unlikely” the
report
would:
“… present
conclusive proof of Iraqi possession of WMD, although
General
Dayton said
it should provide ample evidence that Iraq was in material breach
of
UNSCR 1441
because of the level of deception and concealment of Iraqi
WMD
(eg the
missile plans and the BW vials)”.
442.
In a Note to
No.10 officials on 16 August, Mr Blair listed three
foreign policy
priorities,
including “Iraq/Afghanistan”.232
On Iraq and
WMD he wrote:
“As a
discrete part of our strategy, the issue of WMD and Iraq as a
threat must
be dealt
with. But this can be done. We have Hutton; we have an ISG report
in
September;
we will be, hopefully, in a better position inside Iraq. But NS
[Sir Nigel
Sheinwald,
successor to Sir David Manning as Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy
Adviser] and
team should
draw up a strategy on this.”
443.
On
19 August, Mr Sérgio Vieira de Mello, the UN
Secretary-General’s Special
Representative
for Iraq, was killed in an attack on the UN headquarters in
Baghdad
Deteriorating
security in Iraq had an increasing impact on ISG operations
from
summer 2003.
On
13 August, the DIS reported the possibility of an emerging
pattern of shootings at
scientists
who co-operated with the ISG.234
On
19 August, a bomb exploded outside the UN headquarters at the
Canal Hotel
in Baghdad,
killing 22 UN staff and visitors, including Mr Sérgio Vieira
de Mello,
the UN Secretary-General’s
Special Representative for Iraq (see
Section 9.2).235
232
Note [Blair
to No.10 officials], 16 August 2003, [untitled].
233
Report of
the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in
Iraq, 20 October 2003.
234
Op
ROCKINGHAM Daily, 13 August 2003.
235
Report of
the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in
Iraq, 20 October 2003.
512