The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The
immediate question is how big a part the UK should play in
humanitarian
preparations.
It would be helpful to know whether you think the UK should
remain
modest or
aim higher in terms of our humanitarian contribution to resolving
the Iraq
crisis. If
you want the UK to take more of a lead … then I would be willing to
do that.
But it
would need to be an effort on behalf of the whole Government, not
just my
department.
“I think
the way in which you could best help is to make clear across the
system that
you want
humanitarian considerations to be given more weight. In addition it
would
help if we
could settle the financial questions.”
230.
Ms Short
announced in Parliament on 10 February that she had provided
£3.5m
to support
UN humanitarian contingency planning.144
231.
On 11
February, a Treasury official invited Mr Brown’s comments on
officials’ “first
thoughts”
on Treasury policies in a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq.145
The
official identified
the
Treasury’s “two main finance ministry interests” in Iraq as
ensuring its prosperity
and
stability while fairly sharing the costs of achieving this. The
costs of ensuring Iraq’s
prosperity
and stability were “potentially massive”, and comprised
peacekeeping costs
(the UK
contribution to peacekeeping in the FRY had peaked at £325m in
1999/2000),
humanitarian
assistance, environmental costs, reconstruction and economic
stabilisation
(including
IMF lending). An “emerging policy position” would be
to:
•
maximise
the Iraqi contribution, initially by maintaining the OFF
programme;
•
push for
debt rescheduling, to ensure that Iraqi contributions were
not
knocked off
course by having to resume crippling debt service. The cost
would
“conveniently
fall to probable non‑combatant countries”;
•
maximise
contributions from development banks;
•
push for
bilateral contributions “to take into account military
contributions”,
assuming
that the UK military contribution was significant; and
•
ensure a
finance ministry/international financial institution (IFI) lead on
financing
issues,
with a clear understanding that no money was committed until
needs
were
properly understood.
232.
The Treasury
told the Inquiry that Mr Brown did not
comment.146
233.
Mr Blair
convened the first Ministerial meeting on humanitarian issues
with
Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon, Ms Short, Adm Boyce and No.10 officials in the
margins of Cabinet
144
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10 February
2003, column 526W.
145
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 11 February 2003, ‘HMT
Policy on Post‑Saddam Iraq’
attaching
Paper Treasury, 11 February 2003, ‘Post‑War Iraq: International
Financing Policy’.
146
Email
Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 26
February 2010, [untitled].
480