3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
bombings in
Bali on 12 October, a JIC Assessment of the current threat from
Islamic
extremists
was produced at short notice on 16 October.137
401.
Mr Campbell
wrote on 15 October that the question of “how can we do
terrorism
and Iraq”
was “growing”, and that Mr Blair was “keen to build argument
that they were
part of the
same coin”.138
402.
The minutes of
the JIC discussion on 16 October record that the draft
Assessment
focused “on
the areas of greatest current concern and presented a rather
sombre
picture”.139
The final
Assessment could “bring out the changing nature … of the
threat
to the UK,
especially CBW attacks”. There was “a huge amount of intelligence
and
a
kaleidoscope of ghastly possibilities, but it was important to
balance that with the
aspirational
nature of much of the planning – not all threats came to
fruition”.
403.
The Assessment
addressed the overall threat posed by AQ and other
Islamic
extremists.
In relation to the UK and US interests, the JIC judged that: “Many
known
threats to
Western interests include US interests as a target. Planning and
preparation
for attacks
in the UK itself is probably also in progress. There is a
continuing risk of
displacement
from hardened US targets to the UK, UK interests and other
Western
404.
The JIC
assessed that AQ was “also intent on attacking US allies,
especially the
UK; and
[…]. Intelligence on attacks against US interests often includes UK
interests
as a
parallel or secondary target.”
405.
The Assessment
stated that an AQ network based in northern Iraq was
interested
in the use
of toxic chemical and biological materials, based on techniques
learned in
Afghanistan,
but also wished to mount conventional operations.
406.
The JIC
assessed on 11 October that Saddam Hussein was determined
to
retain
Iraq’s proscribed weapons programme and that he was confident he
could
prevent the
UN inspectors, operating under existing UN resolutions, from
finding
any
evidence before military options started to close in spring
2003.
407.
Without
specific intelligence, the inspectors would not know where to
look.
137
JIC
Assessment, 16 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism, The Current
Threat from Islamic
Extremists’.
138
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
139
Minutes, 16
October 2002, JIC meeting.
140
JIC
Assessment, 16 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism, The Current
Threat from Islamic
Extremists’.
271