6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
Before the
invasion of Iraq, Ministers, senior officials and the UK military
recognised
that
post-conflict civilian and military operations were likely to be
the strategically
decisive
phase of the Coalition’s engagement in Iraq.
•
UK planning
and preparation for the post-conflict phase of operations, which
rested
on the
assumption that the UK would be able quickly to reduce its military
presence
in Iraq and
deploy only a minimal number of civilians, were wholly
inadequate.
•
The
information available to the Government before the invasion
provided a clear
indication
of the potential scale of the post-conflict task and the
significant risks
associated
with the UK’s proposed approach.
•
Foreseeable
risks included post-conflict political disintegration and extremist
violence
in Iraq,
the inadequacy of US plans, the UK’s inability to exert significant
influence
on US
planning and, in the absence of UN authorisation for the
administration and
reconstruction
of post-conflict Iraq, the reluctance of potential international
partners
to contribute
to the post-conflict effort.
•
The
Government, which lacked both clear Ministerial oversight of
post-conflict
strategy,
planning and preparation, and effective co-ordination between
government
departments,
failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately.
•
Mr Blair, who
recognised the significance of the post-conflict phase, did not
press
President
Bush for definite assurances about US plans, did not consider or
seek
advice on
whether the absence of a satisfactory plan called for reassessment
of
the terms
of the UK’s engagement and did not make agreement on such a
plan
a condition
of UK participation in military action.
9.
During 2002
and early 2003, a growing body of evidence on the state of
Iraq
under
Saddam Hussein and on the potential impact of conflict was
available to
UK planners.
10.
The
evidence was fragmented and incomplete. Many of the sources
were
not reliable.
11.
A number of
departments shared responsibility for the gathering, analysis
and
dissemination
of that information.
12.
The principal
sources of information potentially available to UK planners
before
March 2003
on social, political and economic conditions in Iraq
included:
•
the UN,
including the UN-managed Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme;
•
reports on
visits to Iraq by diplomats at the British Embassy in Amman,
Jordan;1
1
Paper FCO,
17 November 2010, ‘Note for the Iraq Inquiry on the FCO’s
diplomatic contacts in Baghdad,
1990-2003’.
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