The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“ISG
found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new
BW
program or
was conducting BW-specific work for military
purposes.”
•
“Nevertheless,
after 1996 Iraq still had a significant dual-use
capability
– some
declared – readily useful for BW if the regime chose to use it
to
pursue a BW
program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most
important
BW asset,
the scientific know-how of its BW cadre.”
•
“Depending
on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an
elementary
BW program
within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do
so,
but ISG
discovered no indications that the regime was pursuing such
a
course.”
•
“The
IIS [Iraqi
Intelligence Service] had a series
of laboratories that
conducted
biological work including research into BW agents for
assassination
purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able …
to
determine
whether any of the work was related to military development
of
BW
agent.”
864.
In his memoir,
Mr Duelfer wrote:
“I [did
not] want the Report to tell people what to think up front: There
was no
executive
summary with a predetermined conclusion. The story of Iraq,
sanctions,
and WMD was
too intricate for that: It deserved to be seen in its entirety,
without
single
aspects being taken out of context.”483
865.
In the
House of Commons on 12 October, Mr Straw described the
ISG
Comprehensive
Report as providing “chapter and verse as to why the policy
of
containment
was not working”.
866.
The
following day, Mr Blair told the Commons:
“Those
people who want to pray in aid the Iraq Survey Group in
respect
of
stockpiles of weapons must also accept the other part of what
the
Iraq
Survey Group said, which is that Saddam retained the intent
and the
capability …
and was in breach of United Nations resolutions. That is
what
Mr Duelfer
expressly said.”
867.
In the House
of Commons on 12 October, Mr Straw stated:
“The [ISG]
Report concludes that by the mid-1990s, Iraq was essentially
free
of weapons
of mass destruction, but it goes on to describe a sophisticated
and
systematic
campaign by Saddam Hussein to bring down the United
Nations
sanctions
regime and to reconstitute his weapons programme.
…
483
Duelfer
C. Hide and
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
598