4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

687.  The Government’s response to the ISC addressed a different point to the issue

of whether Iraq, and its weapons of mass destruction, was a “current and serious threat

to the UK national interest” at the time the dossier was issued.

688.  The statement that Mr Blair believed Iraq and its weapons of mass

destruction was “a current and serious threat to the UK national interest”

reflected his view.

689.  But it did not reflect the view of the JIC, which had addressed the threat

posed by Iraq and assessed that Iraq’s capabilities and intentions were limited

and related to the balance of power in the region and internal challenges.

690.  JIC Assessments between January 2001 and September 2002 did not formally

consider the threat posed by Iraq to UK interests.

691.  In its Assessment of 1 December 2000, the JIC stated:

• “Although Iraqi forces are still large and well organised by regional standards,

a military offensive outside Iraq’s borders would be limited by shortfalls

in equipment and logistics.”

• “UN sanctions have successfully prevented the procurement of new

weapon systems.”

• “While US/UK forces remain deployed in the region and prepared to intervene

militarily, an attack on Kuwait is very unlikely.”

• “Iraq has probably [disassembled and] concealed a handful of 650km range

ballistic missiles that could reach Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and even Israel …

But even if Saddam has such weapons he is unlikely to use them except in

extremis, in order to preserve his regime or as a final gesture of defiance.”374

692.  The JIC Assessment of 28 November 2001 stated:

• “… we judge Iraq had no responsibility for, or foreknowledge of, attacks in the

US on 11 September.”

• “Saddam has refused to permit any Al Qaida presence in Iraq. He is

ideologically poles apart from the Sunni extremist networks linked to UBL

[Usama Bin Laden] and fears their impact on the population.”

• “Iraq has long seen terrorism as a potential weapon in its conflict with the US

and regional enemies. […] Since September 11, however, Saddam is likely

to have ruled out such attacks for the time being, for fear of a heavy

US response.”

• “But in the medium term the threat against Western interests and regional states

remains credible. Saddam has not given up terrorism as a policy tool.”375

374  JIC Assessment, 1 December 2000, ‘Iraq’s Military Capabilities’.

375  JIC Assessment, 28 November 2001, ‘Iraq after September 11 – The Terrorist Threat’.

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