The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the impact
on the oil market; and
•
Saddam
Hussein’s possible use of WMD.
206.
Mr Brenton
wrote that the relevance of the MEPP had not been as
prominent
as might
have been expected: “The hawks’ argument here, which has gained
some
resonance,
is that to postpone action until Arab/Israel improves is to
postpone it
for ever.”
207.
Mr Brenton
also wrote that US public opinion was “lukewarmly supportive
of
action …
Commentators believe that if a public case begins to be made that
support will
firm
up.”
208.
Mr Brenton
concluded:
“… the hard
questions are now … on the table and it is clear to the main
players
that they
are going to have to make a convincing case before going ahead with
any
action. So
far the absence of a political green light has hindered them in
making that
case … The
expectations that have now been generated will make it very
difficult
for the
President to do nothing (though this … does not mean that military
action is
inevitable)
… Even if concrete action … is still some way off, the Republicans
would
far prefer
an Autumn in which the press is dominated by Iraq headlines than
one
where the
economy is the lead story.”
209.
Copies of the
letter were sent to a number of addressees, including
Sir David Manning.
210.
When
Mr Blair returned to No.10 after his holiday, he set out his
concerns
about the
public debate, and that he and President Bush had been “outed”
as
having
decided on military action when no decisions had been
taken.
211.
Mr Blair
stated that the “strategy” should be aimed at answering
the
questions
of those who might support military action and, in doing so, set
Iraq
in a
bigger context.
212.
Mr Blair
set out a series of steps to achieve that, including working for a
new
UN Security
Council resolution which would effectively become an
ultimatum.
213.
Conflict
would depend on the regime’s response, but Mr Blair did not
think it
would be
long before Saddam’s true intention was clear.
214.
As part of a
wider note to No.10 officials on 30 August, Mr Blair set out
his position
on
Iraq:
“I don’t
need any convincing as to where we are on this. The state of
opinion, the
difficulties.
The problems are compounded by the fact that [President] Bush
and
myself have
been ‘outed’ as having decided for war, come what may, when
actually
130