The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(such as
privatisation) that risked undermining that process. It also sought
to increase
support for
Iraqi government institutions, to prepare them to fulfil their
responsibilities for
the
administration of Iraq (in only seven months’ time).
67.
In December,
DFID approved the first of a series of projects which aimed to
build
the
capacity of key institutions at the centre of the Iraqi Government,
including the
Prime
Minister’s Office. The Treasury also provided support to the Iraqi
Government on
budgeting
and financial management.
68.
Resolution
1546, which was adopted on 8 June 2004, endorsed the formation of
a
sovereign
Interim Government of Iraq (IGI) which would assume full
responsibility for
governing
Iraq by 30 June 2004. The IGI would have “the primary role” in
co‑ordinating
international
assistance, with the support of the UN.21
69.
The resolution
requested Member States, international financial
institutions
and other
organisations to strengthen their efforts to support reconstruction
and
development.
70.
At the end of
June 2004, the CPA formally handed over power to the Interim
Iraqi
Government
(IIG) and the US and UK ceased to be Occupying Powers in Iraq. Mr
Hilary
Benn, the
International Development Secretary, welcomed the fact that “Iraqis
were
clearly in
charge” and that the UK was moving “from a phase of doing things
for the
Iraqis to
supporting them doing it for themselves”.22
Despite
that, there were concerns
among DFID
officials that the IIG was ill‑prepared to administer Iraq and lead
the
reconstruction
effort.
71.
Both the
incoming Iraqi Government and the US established new structures
to
manage and
deliver reconstruction in Iraq.
72.
The UK’s
priorities were to maintain the momentum of the political process
towards
elections
in January 2005 and to ensure that the conditions for the drawdown
of UK
forces
(planned to begin in 2005) were achieved.
73.
An immediate
UK concern was the growing insurgency in Sunni areas.
During
the autumn,
Mr Blair pressed DFID to increase the pace of reconstruction so
that Iraqi
citizens
could see a reconstruction dividend before the elections and to do
more in cities
across Iraq
where the IIG had regained control from insurgents.
74.
DFID’s
response focused on the steps it had already taken to accelerate
the pace
of
reconstruction in the South, in the face of growing insecurity. It
did not substantively
address Mr
Blair’s request that it should do more in cities where the IIG had
regained
control
from insurgents.
21
UN Security
Council resolution 1546 (2004).
22
Minutes, 1
July 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
538