The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
46.
For the first
meeting of the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 9 September, an
IPU
paper
maintained that the focus should be on the Iraqi Civil Defence
Corps (ICDC) and
the police
“as the most likely to produce quick results, while continuing to
support the
longer‑term
development of the New Iraqi Army”.26
It did not
address Mr Blair’s target
of doubling
police officer numbers. It assessed that “the main problem in
developing
the Iraqi
Police is the slowness with which CPA is developing its strategy,
concept and
timelines
for reform” and that “in the absence of a central strategy, we are
pursuing
regional
options”.
47.
The Annotated
Agenda for the meeting of the AHMGIR on 18 September
re‑affirmed
the
requirement for a “coherent overall policing
strategy”.27
Cabinet
Office officials
reported
that the UK was lobbying Ambassador Bremer, and Washington, to
expedite
creation of
a strategy and operational plan, and was offering the services of
DCC Brand
to write
them. The Annotated Agenda did not reflect Mr Blair’s desire
to double the
number of
police officers.
48.
Despite the
IPU’s analysis that lack of strategic direction for police reform
was
the “main
problem”, it was not mentioned in a report to Mr Blair from
Mr Straw’s office
on 17 October.
That risked giving an unrealistic impression of both what had
been
achieved
and what might be achieved in the future. The report stated: “We
judge that the
Coalition
now has a credible and deliverable strategy to train 30,000 Iraqi
police over
the next
year.”28
By that
stage, around 40,000 police officers were considered to
have
been
trained.
49.
Mr Straw
told the Inquiry that he considered that judgement to be
“reasonable”29
at
the time
but that with hindsight he could see that it was not.
50.
Following the
FCO Police Contributors conference in early October, it was
clear
that
sufficient additional international support to make plans for
accelerated training
deliverable
was unlikely to be forthcoming.
51.
In October, a
public order incident in Basra demonstrated the
continued
deficiencies
of the local police.
52.
Shortly
afterwards, DCC White publicly expressed concerns about the
SSR
programme
in Iraq, and the UK’s resourcing of it, in a documentary broadcast
by BBC
Northern
Ireland. DCC White told the Inquiry that his remarks had caused
controversy
in the UK
and he was left “feeling unsupported and isolated”30
but for the
support of
Sir Hilary
Synnott, Head of CPA(South), and Ms Jane Kennedy, Minister of State
for
Northern
Ireland.
26
Paper IPU,
8 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Security Action Plan’.
27
Annotated
Agenda, 18 September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
28
Letter
Sinclair to Sheinwald, 17 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Security and
Policing’.
29
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, page 140.
30
Statement,
20 June 2010, pages 30‑31.
424