The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“This all
looks unwieldy, but I am confident that it will work … In managing
this, the
trick will
be to have a clear co-ordinating and tasking arrangement, without
vast
meetings …
We will need to keep [overseas] posts well briefed and targeted,
while
encouraging
them to exercise maximum restraint in reporting …”
64.
The FCO
Emergency Unit, responsible for co-ordination of all aspects of FCO
Iraq
policy
during the military campaign, opened on 14 March
2003.37
The FCO
Consular
Crisis
Centre opened on 17 March. Both operated 24 hours a day throughout
the
military campaign.
65.
After the
closure of the Emergency Unit on 2 May, Mr Ricketts resumed daily
Iraq
policy
meetings in his office from 6 May.38
66.
The 1994
Intelligence Services Act placed the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) on
a statutory
basis, giving the Foreign Secretary responsibility for the work of
SIS, defining
the
functions of the Service and the responsibilities of its Chief, who
is known as C.39
67.
The principal
role of SIS is the production of secret intelligence on issues
concerning
Britain’s
vital interests in the fields of security, defence, foreign and
economic policies
in
accordance with requirements established by the Joint Intelligence
Committee
(JIC) and
approved by Ministers. SIS uses human and technical sources to
meet
those
requirements, as well as liaison with a wide range of foreign
intelligence and
68.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Inquiry:
“… the
Service is not the Foreign Office. It’s not a policy department.
It’s a
department
which is essentially an operational department, which contains
a
lot of people
with some really remarkable knowledge and
expertise.”41
69.
Under Section
2 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Chief is responsible
for
the
efficiency of the Service and it is:
“… his duty
to ensure –
a. that
there are arrangements for securing that no information is
obtained
by the
Intelligence Service except so far as is necessary for the
proper
discharge
of its functions and that no information is disclosed except so
far
as
necessary –
(i) for
that purpose;
37
Telegram
130 FCO London to Abidjan, 13 March 2003, ‘Opening of FCO Emergency
Unit’.
38
Minutes, 1
May 2003, FCO Emergency Unit Iraq meeting.
39
Intelligence
Services Act 1994.
40
Cabinet
Office, National
Intelligence Machinery, 9 October
2001, page 6.
41
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, page 12.
278