Executive
Summary
advised on
21 May against deploying 16 Air Assault Brigade. The Chiefs of
Staff did not
conclude
that the tasks it was proposed that 16 Air Assault Brigade should
undertake
were
unnecessary, but rather that US troops would complete
them.
655.
On 21 March
2003, the day after the start of the invasion, Mr Powell and
Sir David
Manning,
two of Mr Blair’s closest advisers, offered him advice on how
to influence the
post‑invasion
US agenda. Key among their concerns was the need for
post‑conflict
administrative
arrangements to have the legitimacy conferred by UN endorsement.
Such
UK plans
for the post‑conflict period as had been developed relied on the
deployment of
an
international reconstruction effort to Iraq. Controversy
surrounding the launch of the
invasion
made that challenging to deliver; the absence of UN endorsement
would make
it close to
impossible.
656.
Discussion
between the US and UK on the content of a new UN Security
Council
resolution
began the same day. Resolution 1483 (2003) was eventually adopted
on
22 May.
657.
US and UK
objectives for the resolution were different, and in several
substantive
respects
the text of resolution 1483 differed from the UK’s preferred
position.
658.
The UK wanted
oil revenues to be controlled by an Iraqi body, or failing that by
the
UN or World
Bank, in line with the pre‑invasion promise to use them exclusively
for the
benefit of
Iraq. Instead, resolution 1483 placed the power to spend the
Development
Fund for
Iraq into the hands of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
overseen by a
monitoring
board. That was in line with US objectives, but did not address UK
concerns.
659.
The UK
considered that an Interim Iraqi Administration should have real
powers,
and not be
subordinate to the CPA. Resolution 1483 said that the CPA would
retain
its
responsibilities until an internationally recognised representative
government was
established.
The text did not go so far as to require an interim administration
to report
formally to
the CPA, as the US wished, but that was in effect how the
relationship
between the
CPA and the Governing Council established by resolution 1483
operated.
660.
The UK’s
policy position was that the UN should take the lead in
establishing the
Interim
Iraqi Administration. Resolution 1483 gave the UN a role working
with the people
of Iraq and
the CPA, but did not give it the lead. Evidence considered by the
Inquiry
suggests
that there was consistent reluctance on the part of the UN to take
on such a
role and
the UK position was therefore not wholly realistic.
661.
Resolution
1483 formally designated the UK and US as joint Occupying
Powers
in Iraq. It
also set the conditions for the CPA’s dominance over post‑invasion
strategy
and policy
by handing it control of funding for reconstruction and influence
on political
development
at least equal to that of the UN.
89