The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that point,
but also noted that the intelligence had said that chemical
warheads were
still
available for short-range artillery, rockets and so
on.”
483.
Asked whether
the JIC had revised its assessment in the light of the
reports,
Sir John
stated:
“… the JIC
looked again at the issue and recorded its view in the minute
[JIC
Note] of 19
March and judged then that Iraq had a usable chemical and
biological
warfare
capability, deliverable by artillery shells and possibly by aerial
vehicles.
It also
said that missiles might be available to deliver CBW, but Iraq
might lack
the necessary warheads
…”180
484.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 20 March that Saddam Hussein would, in
extremis,
probably
use chemical and biological weapons, and that it was believed that
some were
deployed
with Iraqi forces.181
485.
Mr Scarlett
wrote to Mr Powell on 21 March stating that: “in the current
crisis,
numerous
intelligence reports indicate that Saddam Hussein is prepared to
use CBW
to ensure
the survival of the regime, despite the US again having warned of
the
implications
this would have for Iraq.”182
486.
In the
Security Council discussion on 19 March, Iraq reiterated that it
no
longer
possessed weapons of mass destruction.
487.
The Security
Council held an open debate on Iraq on 19 March (see
488.
In his
statement to the Council, Mr Aldouri expressed his
“appreciation” for the
efforts
made by Council members to find a peaceful solution to the “current
crisis”,
which had
been “created by the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain,
with the
intention
of launching a hostile war against Iraq and occupying it under the
pretext of the
presence in
Iraq of weapons of mass destruction”.
“For the
record, and for the sake of historical accuracy, as well as to
reassure every
State that
has recently made active efforts to maintain peace and to prevent
war, we
would like
to reiterate that Iraq no longer possesses weapons of mass
destruction.
The
presence of such weapons has been relegated to the past. Iraq
decided in
1991 to
destroy the weapons it had produced. That action stemmed from
the
conviction
underlying Iraq’s policy to rid itself of such weapons. Proof of
this fact lies
180
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 47-48.
181
Cabinet
Conclusions, 20 March 2003.
182
Minute
Scarlett to Powell, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Saddam Hussein in
1991’.
183
UN Security
Council, ‘4721st Meeting Wednesday 19 March 2003’
(S/PV.4721).
378