The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

637. Sir Nigel Sheinwald explained to Mr Hadley that Mr Blair believed the “main effort

had to be to get the government formed quickly and then put a major effort into the

public presentation”.

638. On 1 April, Sir Nigel sent Mr Hadley a Note from Mr Blair to President Bush

and asked that it be passed to the President in advance of a planned telephone

conversation.308

639. Mr Blair wrote that the purpose of his note was to consider how the political context

in both the US and UK might be changed. It covered other foreign policy issues as well

as Iraq. Mr Blair explained that he would have welcomed a discussion in person, but had

concluded that the political context was not right for a visit to the US.

640. Mr Blair observed to President Bush that “Iraq pulls us down” and that the weight

of “propaganda” obscured an “inherently strong” case.

641. Mr Blair considered that people considered the coalition to be “right in theory” since

the Iraqi people wanted democracy, but that in practice sectarian violence and the lack

of a government meant that “the facts on the ground beat the argument”.

642. Mr Blair continued:

“We can’t afford for this to continue. I think it is time we started to take risks. We

need to put Iraq in a different place and then build out from there. I want to suggest

a strategy.”

643. That strategy was:

• Go “all out” to get a unity government in Iraq, including a high quality and neutral

Minister of the Interior who would send the message that Shia violence would

not be tolerated.

• Publish a programme for the new Iraqi Government and for security transition

from the MNF to full Iraqi control which would create “a huge collective sense of

moving forward” and needed to be “a complete turning point.”

644. Mr Blair proposed that “we should asap then build out from there” and use the

“renewed credibility of Iraq” to act in other areas including the Middle East Peace

Process, world trade, energy and climate change and Sudan. This would only be as

persuasive as it could be if Iraq was in better shape. Mr Blair argued that “this is the

time to go for it; to take risks. To strive and fail is so much better than not striving. But

actually, I think it could just succeed.”

308 Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 1 April 2006, [untitled] attaching Note TB [Blair to Bush], 1 April 2006,

‘Note’.

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