The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

456. In the oil sector:

“Corruption within the Oil Ministry acts as a deterrent to some foreign investment.

Despite attempts to make bidding processes more transparent, foreign oil

companies willing to pay bribes are likely to receive preferential treatment.”

457. The assessment concluded, under the heading “Outlook”, that:

“Corruption is strongly associated with the slow pace of development and

reconstruction. These issues resonate with voters. As the January 2010 national

elections approach, we judge that Maliki is likely to intensify his policy focus

on corruption as a vehicle for popular appeal and as a tool with which to attack

political opponents.”

458. On 23 July, a letter from Mr Ainsworth’s Private Secretary to Mr Brown’s Private

Secretary for Foreign Affairs explained that further delays in the Iraqi Parliament meant

that it was very unlikely that the UK/Iraq defence agreement would be ratified before late

September.185 The Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the UK should begin the temporary

withdrawal of the remaining UK military personnel to Kuwait.

459. In parallel the UK would make clear that it was prepared to resume activity ahead

of the formal ratification provided that the Iraqi Government issued a clear invitation to

the UK for this purpose and explicitly recognise that the UK’s legally binding jurisdictional

immunities continued beyond 31 July.

460. Mr Ainsworth’s Private Secretary explained:

“The government-to-government agreement we signed on 6 June has … been

proceeding through the Iraqi parliament and passed its second reading (of three

needed) on 7 July. Unfortunately, despite broad support from the main Iraqi political

blocs, walk-outs from the Sadrists (who oppose the presence of any foreign troops

on Iraqi soil) prevented the agreement from being put to a third reading and vote

as planned on 11 and 13 July … It failed again on 21 July … because the Iraqi

parliament did not reach it before finishing for the day.”

461. The FCO Iraq Policy Team advised Mr Miliband’s Private Secretary that in

Baghdad the “Embassy has lobbied key figures to support the agreement throughout,

and aside from the Sadrists there is no major organised opposition inside the CoR”.186

The British Embassy Washington was preparing to lobby Prime Minister Maliki during

his visit to the US.

462. Mr Jon Wilks, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Baghdad, called on Prime

Minister Maliki’s Chief of Staff on 27 July to review the position.187 He explained that UK

185 Letter Ferguson to Fletcher, 23 July 2009, ‘Iraq: UK Military Presence After 31 July 2009’.

186 Minute Croker to PS, 22 July 2009, ‘Iraq Update: Defence Agreement’.

187 Email Wilks to Bowers and Baker, 27 July 2009, ‘UK-Iraq Military Agreement – Call on PM’s Chief

of Staff’.

460