The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

176.  At a meeting of the Iraq Senior Officials Group (ISOG) on 9 September, attendees

were told that:

“… we continued to push for final changes to meet Sunni concerns. The areas

for possible movement were: Arab identity; and the electoral law. The UN was

increasingly concerned that they would miss their deadline for distributing copies

of the Constitution to the Iraqi population.”87

177.  As work to finalise the Constitution continued, concerns were mounting about

security, including in MND(SE).

178.  On 9 September, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary provided him with an update on

Iraq.88 He reported “further cause for concern”, including about:

• Lebanese and Iranian involvement in Iraq;

• the “apparent involvement of members of Basra Police in attacks against

the MNF, and a claim from the Basra Chief of Police that only 500 out of

12,000 Basra Police are loyal to him”; and

• the key role being played by a breakaway group from the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM).

179.  The Private Secretary wrote:

“We still do not have the comprehensive picture that we need of what is going on

in Basra. Kim Howells [FCO Minister of State] visits next week. I have spoken to

his office today and emphasised that you are personally very concerned about the

situation and that we need a serious report from him on this.”

180.  Mr Blair’s reply said:

“This is v. worrying. It all depends on the ISF being built up credibly. But we need

strong messages to Iran, Lebanon and what do we do to disrupt Hizballah?”89

181.  At its meeting on 9 September the ISOG considered the Red Team Report.90

182.  Officials commented that the Report was not an alternative campaign plan, but

a “set of ideas”. The MOD “did not see the report having great traction in Washington,

except at the margins” on the question of how the MNF could pursue the current strategy

more effectively.

183.  The ISOG also observed that the Red Team’s Report contained “risks … for the

UK” as it suggested that “forces (coalition and Iraqi) should be moved from benign to

difficult areas”. The FCO was tasked to provide comments on the Report.

87  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Asquith, 14 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials’.

88  Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 9 September 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.

89  Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 9 September 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.

90  Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Asquith, 14 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Senior Officials’.

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