1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
Containing
the threat against Iraq’s neighbours, seen from here, should be
at
least as
important as the WMD factor. That was the original casus belli
…”
•
“What do we
mean by ‘narrower and deeper’ sanctions?” Mr Jones
Parry’s
talks
appeared to conceive of a two-phase approach, first focusing on
enforcing
essential
sanctions only and then (after the implementation of resolution
1284),
the
suspension of sanctions. But what sanctions would there be left to
suspend
if
sanctions were narrowed before resolution 1284 was
implemented?
•
How UNMOVIC
inspections fitted into the policy.
172.
Mr Sawers
stated that the Cabinet Office was in the Iead in ensuring that
the
issues he
had raised, and other issues, were “worked through
inter-departmentally”, and
suggested
that a paper should be put to Ministers before the end of the
month.
173.
On 12
February, Mr McKane circulated a draft ‘Note by Officials’
highlighting the
key issues
on Iraq that “needed to be settled in the course of the review of
Iraq policy”.96
174.
The draft note
stated that UK policy objectives and containment strategy
remained
valid. The
UK’s main aims were to get the US to accept that:
“•
Even if we
were to conclude that it is preferable not to deploy UNMOVIC, we
need
to be seen
to be working through the UN rather than unilaterally, and with
the
support of
the P5 and the rest of the UNSC [UN Security Council] if possible
…
•
We need to
neutralise the sanctions issue and win back the moral high
ground
… To
achieve this, we need a much more targeted sanctions regime, which
does
not affect
ordinary people. We should move in this direction now, and not wait
for
Saddam to
sign up to UNSCR 1284.”
175.
Mr Sawers
responded to Mr McKane, commenting that the approach set out in
the
note
was:
“… too
status-quo oriented. Our shared concern is that the present policy
is
crumbling,
but the only proposal for adjusting it is to restrict the scope of
sanctions.
The
Americans are in the market for something much more radical … to
sustain a
containment
strategy, if necessary for the next eight years.”97
176.
Mr Sawers’
view was that Ministers, including Mr Blair, would want to consider
a
much more
radical transformation of Iraqi policy. He suggested focusing on
“our three
key
objectives”:
“i) The
defence of Kuwait and Iraq’s neighbours from Iraqi aggression
…
ii)
Blocking WMD build-up … either an inspection regime along SCR 1284
lines …
or a
monitoring regime based outside Iraq …
iii)
Humanitarian relief …”
96
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 12 February 2001, ‘Iraq’ attaching Note [draft],
[undated], ‘Iraq (A Note by
Officials)’.
97
Minute
Sawers to McKane, 12 February 2001, ‘Iraq’.
223