The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
We should
“add our own benchmark on interviews … immediate access
to
a large
number of key people”. That was “where Saddam is really
vulnerable”
and “could
change overnight”.
•
A “little
more time” would be required and there could be a need for
further
meetings
and discussions.
•
It was:
“Crucial to have [a] UN role post-conflict.”
•
The
importance of progress on MEPP.311
1001.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush proposing a further amendment to
the
1002.
Mr Blair
said that an ultimatum should include a deadline of 10 days from
the date
of the
resolution for the Security Council to decide that “Unless … Iraq
is complying by [313],
then Iraq
is in material breach”.
1003.
Mr Blair
stated that if there were nine votes but a French veto, he thought
that
“politically
and legally” UK participation in military action would be
acceptable. “But if
we did not
get nine votes, such participation might be legal”, but he would
face major
obstacles.
It would be “touch and go”.
1004.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also briefly discussed the military
plan.
1005.
Mr Campbell
wrote that he had only heard Mr Blair’s side of the call
“saying
we had
a real problem with world opinion, that these countries need a
reason to come
round, that
he wanted to go to Chile and set out the outlines of an amended
resolution
with a
deadline”.314
Mr Blair
had also told President Bush that he “needed to work
more on
Putin”.
1006.
The record of
the discussion broadly confirms Mr Campbell’s
account.315
1007.
Mr Campbell
also wrote that Dr Blix “was out again today, as much
commentator
as civil
servant”.316
Mr Blair
“felt the UNSC had to take control of this now, not
Blix”.
Mr Powell
had reported that the US and UK “seemed far apart” but
Mr Blair “said it was
not as bad
as that” he had told President Bush “we would be with them come
what
may” but it
was “other countries” who “needed help to come over”. The US had
“claimed
they had
already slowed down as a result of TB, that Bush had wanted to go
as early
as
yesterday but TB made sure they didn’t. It was a pretty grim scene,
and no matter,
how grim,
TB was still saying constantly that it was the right thing to
do.”
311
Minute
Rycroft to
Prime
Minister, 5 March 2003, ‘Bush Call’.
312
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with
Bush, 5 March’.
314
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
315
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with
Bush, 5 March’.
316
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
360