3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
on major
negotiations, such as resolution 1441 “pretty rare”. He reported
“ultimately
to the
Permanent Representative [Sir Jeremy Greenstock]”. There
was:
“… no line
of reporting, direct or indirect to the FCO Legal Adviser in London
…
Nor was
there any routine process of … reporting on legal issues or
anything of
that sort.”
1011.
Sir Michael
Wood wrote that “the work of a legal adviser overseas is
quite
different
from that of a lawyer in London, having large policy and
representational
elements”.375
The Legal
Counsellor and First Secretary (Legal) in UKMIS New
York
reported to
the UK Permanent Representative to the UN and, while it was
“important”
that the
links to the FCO Legal Advisers were maintained, it would not have
been
“appropriate”
for them to “report directly to, and effectively work under the
FCO
Legal Adviser”.
“… the
negotiation of SCR 1441 was wholly exceptional, with Washington
firmly in
the lead
and key negotiations taking place directly between foreign
ministers and
often on
the telephone. The negotiating process was quite different from
that for
other SCRs,
such as SCRs 1154, 1205, the second resolution in early 2003,
and
subsequent
resolutions on Iraq adopted in 2003/4.”
1013.
As a result,
in Sir Michael’s view: “It was, therefore, not always easy for
anyone,
including
the lawyers, to follow the negotiations blow‑by‑blow and to feed in
considered
and timely
advice in the usual way.”376
1014.
In
Mr Macleod’s view, the UK Mission in New York had had “a
relatively limited
role” in
the drafting of resolution 1441:
“The main
components of the draft came to us from Washington via
London.”377
1015.
Mr Macleod
wrote that he had received “no instructions” from London in
relation
to the
negotiation of resolution 1441 “beyond or in addition to those
received by
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock and UKMIS”.378
1016.
Mr Macleod
told the Inquiry that, “as a member of Sir Jeremy’s team”,
he
was
“closely involved in the negotiation of what became UNSCR 1441 from
an early
stage”.379
He “knew
what we were trying to achieve and attended the majority of
the
negotiating
sessions”. He had: “Occasionally … noted and reported the
discussion”,
but “on
the whole” he had “a watching brief”.
375
Statement,
15 March 2011, page 1.
376
Statement,
15 March 2011, page 9.
377
Statement,
24 June 2010, paragraph 12.
378
Statement,
24 June 2010, paragraph 10.
379
Statement,
24 June 2010, paragraph 12.
377