The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
311.
The Butler
Report also stated that the Assessment fairly reflected the
intelligence
on Iraq’s
chemical weapons programme, and that the word “may” had been used
to
reflect
previous intelligence reports on the production and weaponisation
of chemical
agent.141
But it
added, “we believe the position is best described by a DIS
commentary
at the
time”, which stated:
“Since
1998, there have been numerous claims that Iraq has continued
to
weaponise
agent, but much of the reporting has come from dubious sources
and
that worth
closer examination has lacked collateral and remains
unsubstantiated.”
312.
Mr Miller
told the Inquiry that there was little new intelligence on the
chemical
warfare
programme, “but one of the reports on ballistic missiles had
carried at least the
implication
that the person reporting believed that there was filling of
missile warheads
with
chemical agents”.142
313.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry that the May 2001 Assessment on
chemical
agents had
been “slightly stronger” than that of March 2002.143
314.
Mr Miller
added that imagery had shown that plants which had been destroyed
had
been
“recreated”, “in some cases … with apparently surprising levels of
security”.144
But
the reasons
for the “less firm” assessment in March 2002 were “no longer
completely
clear”. His
view was that:
“… it
reflected the judgement of the particular group of experts who had
been
convened on
each occasion to look at the evidence. They reached slightly
different
conclusions
on the weight to attach to it.”
315.
Sir John
Scarlett also drew attention to the assessment of Iraq’s ability to
conceal
and
disperse its weaponry and that there was:
“…
intelligence to show … that thinking was being given to that and
orders had
gone out
accordingly and there had been a temporary dispersal of what was
called
‘sensitive
equipment’ after 9/11.”145
316.
Sir John
added: “It was a firm underlying judgement that Iraq was pushing
where
it could,
but there was little detailed intelligence on nuclear and chemical
programmes.”
That had
been “set against the underlying judgements [in earlier
Assessments] on
command and
control and logistical support, weaponisation”. But it did not
answer
the
questions of what chemical or biological agents Iraq currently
possessed or
141
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
276.
142
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 8.
143
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 9-10.
144
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 10.
145
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 38.
146
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 38-39.
72