9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
was
fragile, however, and would need to be sustained in order for the
current relative
calm to continue.
483.
According to
Sir John Scarlett’s own account of the meeting,
Mr Brown:
“… spoke
very strongly on the cease-fire in Basra and the dramatic
improvement
in the
security situation. This represented a huge
opportunity.”233
484.
Mr Brown
expressed thanks and admiration for the work on that
initiative.
485.
Sir John
recorded that “CDS [ACM Stirrup] argued that we must take
the
opportunity
to push forward events while the tide was running in our favour”.
Mr Brown
endorsed
the point that the cease-fire was not simply about prisoner
releases; the UK
had to show
progress on the political and economic front, on which JAM1 was
also
focused.
486.
In a covering
comment, Sir John added that the Prime Minister had:
“…
personally … acknowledged the importance of [NAME OF OPERATION]
…
He also
understands that the effort has to move into the political and
economic
sphere and
not just the security issue. So there are signs of traction at the
top of
government;
…”
487.
Mr Prentice
shared key points from an advance copy of Mr Brown’s statement
to
Parliament
with Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, and shared its full text
shortly
before
Mr Brown began to speak in Parliament.
488.
Mr Prentice
reported that Gen Petraeus had been “complimentary” about
the
statement,
describing it as the culmination of “a good process of consultation
altogether”
which has
worked out “a sensible way ahead” on UK force
levels.234
489.
Both Gen
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker repeated the US concern that
the
UK presence
should be centred on Basra, not elsewhere in southern Iraq.
Mr Prentice
assured
both that this was not in doubt: the geographical description
“Southern Iraq”
was simply
used to distinguish UK forces from those elsewhere in
Iraq.
490.
Gen Petraeus
also emphasised the need to be cautious about the stability
of
improved
conditions in Basra: the underlying factors behind it were fragile
and the UK
should be
ready to respond if conditions required it.
491.
On 8 October,
Lt Gen Odierno recommended to Gen Petraeus that Basra
should move
to PIC in December.235
He had been
encouraged by the positive impact
that
Gen Mohan and Gen Jalil were having but remained concerned by
reports of
233
Email C, 9
October 2007, ‘Iraq NSID 8 Oct 2007’ attaching Note, ‘NSID Iraq – 8
October 2007’.
234
eGram
41359/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 October 2007, ‘Iraq: PM’s
Statement: Reactions from
Petraeus
and Crocker’.
235
Minute
Binns to CJO, 11 October 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
11 October 2007’.
273