The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
democratic,
stable or progressive”, and “no final decisions had been taken on
Iraq”:
“He had
been hoping there would be a new UN resolution and inspectors back
in.”39
118.
In response to
comments about the evidence of Iraqi activity, Mr Blair said the
UK
was “giving
thought to how to produce the necessary evidence”. Nothing would
“happen
precipitately”
and there might be “other ways to deal with Iraq, for instance if
Saddam
allowed
inspectors back in”.
119.
In his memoir,
Mr Annan wrote that in late February he had been told by a
senior
British
diplomat that the US “was determined to have the resolutions
obeyed, or ‘to have
the regime
out’”.40
When Mr
Annan had “responded that Saddam Hussein had a habit
of
miscalculating”,
he had been told “either they [the US] will get rid of the
capability or they
will get
rid of him [Saddam Hussein]”.
“But what
was also clear, even to the most ardent of opponents of military
action
was that
the current strategy wasn’t working: the sanctions could never be
made
‘smart’
enough to spare the Iraqi people from continued suffering; nor were
they
robust
enough to ensure with certainty that Baghdad wasn’t finding ways to
rearm
in contravention
of its obligations …”
121.
A report of
discussions between Mr Blair and other European leaders at
the
Progressive
Governance Summit in Stockholm stated that “there was a general
sense …
that it
would be counter-productive to confront the US. The wiser course
was to get the
US to widen
their agenda and encourage them to approach the issue from a
coalition
perspective.”41
Mr Blair’s
overall sense from those discussions was that it “would be
a
challenging
task, but possible” to bring France and Germany
“onside”.
122.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 26 February that the immediate US focus was
on
getting the
Goods Review List agreed. After that, the UK wanted Security
Council
discussions
on the arrangements for inspections, but US support was
uncertain.
If “against
all expectations” UNMOVIC was allowed to do its job that would
“offer
the best
prospect of dealing with Iraq’s WMD”.
123.
The FCO
advice did not address the wider issues arising from
the
uncertainty
about US policy and the possibility of military action, or what the
UK’s
response
should be to that.
39
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 25 February 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with UN Secretary General,
25 February’.
40 Annan
K. Interventions:
A Life In War And Peace. Allen Lane,
2012.
41
Letter
Tatham to McDonald, 24 February 2002, ‘Stockholm Progressive
Governance Summit: Iraq’.
408