The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
957.
Maj Gen Shaw
told the Inquiry that the job of discussing the
accommodation
with the
Iraqi Government fell to Maj Gen Rollo, who “took it to the
Government of Iraq
through
Rubaie, the security adviser, and got the clearance”. The reaction
was “positive”.
Maj Gen
Shaw had also been told that “Maliki had been appraised of the
situation
958.
On 4 April, a
Cabinet Office official updated Mr Brown that the situation in
Basra
had “calmed
considerably” but remained “fragile”.475
Operations
continued, with both
US and UK
“Military Training Teams” now in support of Iraqi forces. Both
Prime Minister
Maliki and
the Sadrists were claiming victory and relations between them were
at a low
point, both
nationally and in Basra, which would be “a set back for
reconciliation and the
legislative
programme”. Rebuilding UK-Iraq relations was likely to be “an
uphill struggle”.
959.
As a result of
the Charge of the Knights the US now had troops on the ground
in
Basra
(around 700 at the COB and more than 400 embedded with the ISF) and
was
proposing a
joint UK-US headquarters since “a return to the status quo ante”
was not
an option.
The UK’s “supposed red line for Basra’s militias has therefore
already been
crossed,
with US troops already on the streets”. Indications were that the
US intended to
maintain an
enhanced presence in Basra for the longer term, and there could be
some
additional
short-term increases.
960.
The Cabinet
Office official also updated Mr Brown on Gen Petraeus
and
Ambassador
Crocker’s forthcoming appearance before Congress. They were “likely
to
present the
Basra operation as a sharp spike in violence with repercussions
still to play
out, but
highlighting some positives in the operation.” It was possible they
would “major
on the role
of Iran” and the overall assessment was likely to prompt President
Bush to
“agree the
case for a cautious approach to future troop
reductions”.
961.
Attached to
the update was a letter from Mr Day to Ms Aldred containing
advice
on “how US
and UK military planning was proceeding in Basra”.476
Mr Day
wrote that
short-term
increases in US troop numbers were possible, to help the ISF
“establish
the
security conditions on the ground that will allow consent-winning
economic effect
to be
delivered”. Their activity might include “targeted strike
operations, an information
campaign,
ground patrols and the establishment of ISF strong-points in the
city”, but
since Gen
Petraeus had said there were no plans to send significant numbers
of US
troops to
MND(SE) then “the responsibility for any reinforcement in Basra
itself could fall
to UK
forces”.
474
Private
hearing, 21 June 2010, page 30.
475
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 4 April 2008,
‘Basra: Update for the
Prime Minister’.
476
Letter Day
to Aldred, 4 April 2008, ‘Military Plans for Basra’.
360