The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“it would
be helpful for my colleagues in London to have a better feel for
the ‘post‑conflict’
thinking
and aftermath management”.173
The
experience of Afghanistan had shown:
“… that it
is every bit as important to win the peace as it is to win the war.
That will
be even
truer in Iraq. I would not wish to over state the case, but it is
undoubtedly
true that
both UK politicians and my military colleagues would like to know
what we
are getting
ourselves into in the longer term.”
302.
Mr Blair
raised post-conflict issues with President Bush at the end of
July.
303.
Mr Blair
made clear that his own thinking on what might follow
Saddam
Hussein was
still fluid.
304.
Mr Blair sent
a personal Note to President Bush on 28 July.174
The ‘Note on
Iraq’,
which is
addressed in detail in Section 3.3, stated that removing Saddam
Hussein was
the right
thing to do, but that establishing a new regime would take time.
The US and
UK would
need to commit to Iraq for the long term and, without coalition
partners, there
was a
possibility the unintended consequences of removing Saddam Hussein
would
persist
beyond the military phase. Part of the message to win round
potential partners
might be
that regime change must protect Iraq’s territorial integrity and
provide security.
That might
involve another key military figure, but should lead in time to a
democratic
Iraq,
governed by the people. Mr Blair would need advice on whether that
approach
was feasible,
but just swapping one dictator for another seemed inconsistent with
US
and UK
values.
305.
Sir David
Manning delivered the ‘Note on Iraq’ to Dr Rice on 29
July.175
306.
Sir David told
the Inquiry that he had a “pre-meeting” with Mr
Armitage.176
During
that
meeting, Mr Armitage said that the US was thinking through “day
after” scenarios
and that
“it was better to be right than to hurry”.177
307.
The record of
Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush on 31 July included
a
brief
reference to post-conflict Iraq: that focusing on the end state of
a democratic Iraq
would give
the US and UK the moral high ground.178
308.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair explained:
“I did ask
… President Bush in July 2002 whether it might be feasible to
install a
military
leader then move to democracy in Iraq. I cannot recall specifically
calling
for formal
advice, but the subject of what sort of Iraq we wanted to create
was part
173
Paper
Wilson, [undated], ‘CENTCOM Iraq Planning – A UK
Perspective’.
174
Note Blair
[to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.
175
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
176
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 17.
177
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Armitage’.
178
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 31 July’.
164