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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“it would be helpful for my colleagues in London to have a better feel for the ‘post‑conflict’
thinking and aftermath management”.173 The experience of Afghanistan had shown:
“… that it is every bit as important to win the peace as it is to win the war. That will
be even truer in Iraq. I would not wish to over state the case, but it is undoubtedly
true that both UK politicians and my military colleagues would like to know what we
are getting ourselves into in the longer term.”
302.  Mr Blair raised post-conflict issues with President Bush at the end of July.
303.  Mr Blair made clear that his own thinking on what might follow Saddam
Hussein was still fluid.
304.  Mr Blair sent a personal Note to President Bush on 28 July.174 The ‘Note on Iraq’,
which is addressed in detail in Section 3.3, stated that removing Saddam Hussein was
the right thing to do, but that establishing a new regime would take time. The US and
UK would need to commit to Iraq for the long term and, without coalition partners, there
was a possibility the unintended consequences of removing Saddam Hussein would
persist beyond the military phase. Part of the message to win round potential partners
might be that regime change must protect Iraq’s territorial integrity and provide security.
That might involve another key military figure, but should lead in time to a democratic
Iraq, governed by the people. Mr Blair would need advice on whether that approach
was feasible, but just swapping one dictator for another seemed inconsistent with US
and UK values.
305.  Sir David Manning delivered the ‘Note on Iraq’ to Dr Rice on 29 July.175
306.  Sir David told the Inquiry that he had a “pre-meeting” with Mr Armitage.176 During
that meeting, Mr Armitage said that the US was thinking through “day after” scenarios
and that “it was better to be right than to hurry”.177
307.  The record of Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush on 31 July included a
brief reference to post-conflict Iraq: that focusing on the end state of a democratic Iraq
would give the US and UK the moral high ground.178
308.  In his statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair explained:
“I did ask … President Bush in July 2002 whether it might be feasible to install a
military leader then move to democracy in Iraq. I cannot recall specifically calling
for formal advice, but the subject of what sort of Iraq we wanted to create was part
173  Paper Wilson, [undated], ‘CENTCOM Iraq Planning – A UK Perspective’.
174  Note Blair [to Bush], 28 July 2002, ‘Note on Iraq’.
175  Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
176  Public hearing, 30 November 2009, page 17.
177  Minute Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Armitage’.
178  Minute Rycroft to Manning, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 31 July’.
164
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