6.3 | Military equipment (pre-conflict)

503. On 2 April, Lt Gen Fry advised Adm Boyce on the availability of ECBA:

“Despite the allocation of an increased baggage allowance, some units that had

already been issued ECBA in the UK decided to load the plates in unit freight for

surface shipping. Due to poor marking some of these containers were slow in

being delivered to units, resulting [in] personnel crossing the LD [line of departure]

without plates.”250

504. Lt Gen Fry wrote that that was “mitigated by an urgent redistribution programme

that ensured that forward troops were equipped at the expense of those in the rear”.

Following that programme, and subsequent deliveries, the NCHQ estimated that

60 percent of 1(UK) Div had been fitted with ECBA.

505. Following his requests, Mr Flaherty provided Lord Bach with further advice on the

supply and distribution of ECBA on 16 May.251 He wrote that “the majority of troops in

the fighting formations had full combat body armour at the start of combat operations”

but there were “some shortages of ceramic plates which meant that some elements of

7 Armoured Brigade and up to 50% of the Joint Force Logistics did not have ceramic

plates at the outset of hostilities”.

506. Mr Flaherty wrote that shortages were “exacerbated” by the fact that only

ECBA sufficient to “equip the wartime establishment of units” had been procured. He

estimated that “approximately 3,500 personnel, the majority of which were not in fighting

formations, were affected by the shortage. About 500 sets of ECBA were withdrawn from

rear units and redistributed to the front line”.

507. The DOC’s 17 October 2003 report stated that, before the invasion, the DLO

“were not mandated to hold stocks of ECBA sufficient to meet the requirements of this

operation”.252 It stated that 36,000 sets of ECBA were deployed to theatre which were

“sufficient” to meet the total requirement but “late delivery, coupled with difficulties in

consignment tracking and poor unit level control, led to localised shortfalls”.

508. The Inquiry asked the MOD for a statement on planned stockholdings for ECBA

and the actual levels of stockholdings between July and September 2002. The MOD

advised that, on 1 July 2002, it had 25,754 plates in stock and by 30 September this

figure was 30,482.253

509. The MOD’s Lessons for the Future report in December 2003 stated:

“The decision (a change in policy) to equip all Service personnel whose role it

required with Enhanced Combat Body Armour … posed a challenge because there

were insufficient stocks to meet the needs of a large scale force. Through additional

250 Minute DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 2 April 2003, ‘Combat ID and ECBA’.

251 Minute PJHQ Civ Sec to PS/Minister(DP), 16 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC UORs’.

252 Report DOC, 17 October 2003, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study’.

253 Paper [MOD], 21 December 2010, ‘Equipment and Capability Issues (pre-invasion)’.

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