The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1085.
The record of
the AHGI on 10 January stated:
“MOD is to
begin work on the practicalities of a possible UK military role
in
administering
immediate post-Saddam Iraq. It was agreed that this work needed
to
take place
in the context of existing contingency planning and with the
involvement
of other
interested departments. As a first step, the CO [Cabinet Office]
would copy
a complete
set of post-Saddam Iraq papers to the MOD.”521
1086.
One item not
recorded in the minutes of the 8 January Chiefs of Staff
meeting,
but
reported separately by Mr Ehrman, was a decision that DFID and DTI
would be
brought
into MOD humanitarian and reconstruction planning, but “without
being told
1087.
Exactly how to
engage DFID in military planning remained unresolved.
On 8 January,
Mr Webb wrote to Mr Lee:
“The
question is now before us of exactly who is going to organise CIMIC
and the
Civil
Transition in any areas occupied by UK forces (let alone the wider
problem with
the US). It
was agreed … today that we need to get DFID in on humanitarian
and,
with DTI,
aftermath aspects of Iraq planning.”523
Mr Webb
added:
“… I wonder
whether we could use a ‘wider group’ approach in Whitehall that
avoids
military
detail and dates (and I heard an interesting SPG idea for a proper
planning
conference
to kick it off thoroughly) …
“We might
be able to go further subsequently with staff properly posted to
PJHQ and
the JFHQ
[Joint Force Headquarters]. Experience has been generally good of
DFID
people
deploying with JFHQs (especially to ‘herd’ NGOs) …”
1088.
On 13 January
Dr Brewer reported to Ms Short “some limited progress with
MOD
and FCO but
not with No.10” in pursuing Ms Short’s request “to persuade others
in
Whitehall
that any UK military role in Iraq should focus on providing
security for the Iraqi
people (a
‘stabilisation force’)”.524
1089.
Dr Brewer
asked Ms Short:
“Are you
content for us to work with MOD on a strategy for a later phase
of
stabilisation?
I know your conception is of a UK military role limited to
stabilisation.
521
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
522
Minute
Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 8 January 2003, ‘Iraq: military
aspects’.
523
Minute Webb
to DG Op Pol, 8 January 2003, ‘DFID Involvement in Iraq Planning
and Preparations’.
524
Minute
Brewer to Secretary of State [DFID], 13 January 2003, ‘Iraq: A
Stabilisation Force’.
296