4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
attempting
to acquire nuclear related technology and materials, such as
specialised
aluminium,
which is prohibited under the terms of international
non-proliferation
agreements
because of its potential application to gas centrifuges used
to
enrich uranium.”
261.
As long as
sanctions hindered the import of “crucial goods”, Iraq “would find
it
difficult
to produce a nuclear weapon”. It was assessed that “Iraq would need
five years
to produce
a weapon” if all sanctions were lifted, and progress would be “much
quicker if
Iraq was
able to buy suitable fissile material”.
262.
In relation to
chemical and biological weapons, the draft paper stated: “Iraq has
a
capability
to produce CBW weapons at short notice.” It set out Iraq’s
activities pre‑1991,
including
its use of chemical weapons against Iran and Kurds in Northern
Iraq; its
history of
denying its chemical and biological programmes; and the estimates
of material
produced
which the UN weapons inspectors had been unable to account
for.
263.
The draft
paper added that the UK assessed that Iraq had:
“… a covert
chemical and biological weapons programme. All the
necessary
expertise
has been retained. Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual
use
equipment
at suspect facilities, which could be used for chemical or
biological
weapon
production … Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in terms of
producing
biological
weapons.”
264.
The draft
paper also stated that Iraq had developed “Strategies that enable
key
parts of
the chemical and biological weapons programme to survive a military
strike”;
and that it
was:
“…
modifying L-29 light aircraft and seeking UAV [Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle]
technology,
which would be suited for delivery of chemical and biological
weapons.”
265.
The draft
paper was also sent to Sir Richard Wilson, Cabinet Secretary, the
heads
of the
intelligence Agencies, Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political
Director, AM French,
Mr Webb,
Mr McKane and Mr Miller.
266.
Mr Miller
sent the draft to the US Embassy in London asking for
comments,
including
if it raised “any sensitivities from an intelligence perspective”,
and any
additional
input that “might strengthen the public case”, by early the
following week.118
267.
At the JIC
meeting on 6 March, Sir David Manning said it would be “very
helpful if
an updated
assessment on Iraq’s WMD capabilities could be provided by the end
of the
following
week”, to form part of the package of briefing being prepared for
Mr Blair’s visit
118
Letter
Miller to US Embassy, 6 March 2002, ‘WMD: Public
Handling’.
119
Minutes, 6
March 2002, JIC meeting.
61