The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
need to be
considered in the context of the requirement to achieve “strategic
balance”
with
commitments in Afghanistan, to ensure that both were properly
resourced.
102.
In July 2005,
DOP agreed proposals for both the transfer of the four provinces
in
MND(SE) to
Iraqi control and for the deployment of the UK Provincial
Reconstruction
Team then
based in northern Afghanistan to Helmand province in the South,
along with
an infantry
battlegroup and full helicopter support – around 2,500
personnel.
103.
As described
under the heading ‘Iraqiisation’ below, the proposals to
transfer
responsibility
for security in the four provinces of MND(SE) to Iraqi control were
based
on
high-risk assumptions about the capability of the Iraqi Security
Forces to take
the lead
for security. If those assumptions proved to be inaccurate and the
UK was
unable
to withdraw, agreement to the Helmand deployment in
Afghanistan effectively
constrained
the UK’s ability to respond by increasing troop levels in
Iraq.
104.
In January
2006, Cabinet approved the decision to deploy to
Helmand.
Dr John Reid,
the Defence Secretary, announced that the UK was “preparing
for
a deployment
to southern Afghanistan” which included a Provincial
Reconstruction
Team as
“part of a larger, more than 3,300-strong British force providing
the
105.
The impact of
that decision was summarised neatly by Gen Walker as:
“Militarily,
the UK force structure is already stretched and, with two
concurrent
medium
scale operations in prospect, will soon become exceptionally so
in
106.
Niche
capabilities such as helicopter support and Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target
Acquisition
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) were essential to the successful
conduct
of operations.
107.
From July 2005
onwards, decisions in relation to resources for Iraq were
effectively
made under
the influence of the demands of the UK effort in Afghanistan.
Although
Iraq
remained the stated UK main effort, the Government no longer had
the option of a
substantial
reinforcement of its forces there, should it have considered one
necessary.
When the US
announced in January 2007 that it would send a surge of resources
to
Iraq, the
UK was consequently unable to contemplate a parallel surge of its
own.
108.
The impact of
the decision to deploy to Helmand on the availability of
key
equipment
capabilities for Iraq, and on the level of stretch felt by military
personnel,
is addressed
in Sections 14 and 16.
29
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26 January
2006, columns 1529-1533.
30
Letter
Walker to Richards, 24 January 2006, [untitled].
488